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The Quarterly Journal of the Commission on Christian Higher Education of the National Council of the Churches of Christ in the United States of America



Articles on the Christian College by Walter E. Wiest / William H. Poteat / Roger L. Shinn / Conrad Bergendoff / and others. Theology of Education by Howard B. Jefferson. Reviews. Reports on Christian Institutions and Vocations by Raymond F. McLain / and others.

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The Editor's Preface

THIS NUMBER GIVES its major attention to the nature and role of the Christian College. This is a normal aspect of the interests of *The Christian Scholar*. The church-related colleges are discovering new vitality as they seek to bring the Christian faith and understanding to bear upon their total life, both in their programs of study and related programs of activities. They serve as reminders of the historical fact that in our country, as in our Western culture, some of the most significant initiatives for higher learning, especially in the liberal studies intended to assist persons to be free to live creatively in a free society, are to be found in the Hebrew-Christian heritage. These colleges are at work today, in a new way, to discover the specific implications of the enduring conviction that the education of free and responsible persons must have as its context the heritage and values of high religious faith. A denial of this conviction marks much of higher education and constitutes a peril to free learning, educational coherence, moral foundations, and a sense of life's meaningfulness. That it is being repeatedly reaffirmed by the group of four or five hundred colleges who claim the name "Christian", many of which had begun to question its necessity in practice during the earlier portion of this century, is a fact to be noted and to be dealt with in an appreciative manner by this publication.

The immediate occasion for this number should, however, be considered as having more than routine importance. In addition to the observance of Na-

tional Christian College Day on Sunday, April 25th, providing an opportunity to the colleges and the churches to call special attention to the message and purposes of Christian higher education, this issue also points toward the first major effort of the Christian colleges to meet together across denominational frontiers for a consideration of their unique responsibility in the total educational scene. We refer, of course, to the first Quadrennial Convocation of Christian Colleges, which will be held on the campus of Denison University, Granville, Ohio, June 20-24, 1954. It is anticipated that this convocation will bring together a large number of persons who are representative of the major component elements of the academic communities of some three or four hundred of the Christian colleges in America. Indications of the program plans and specific details are found elsewhere in this issue.

The contents of this number are intended to provide reflection upon the character and the purposes of the Christian college. The first article indicates the overall context for this reflective temper. A symposium on the idea of the Christian college seeks to sharpen the consideration of the college which makes a Christian claim, probing into the major implications of this "qualification" of its existence. It explores the meaning for an educational institution, set in a pluralistic society of many "faiths", to profess its primary loyalty to the Christian faith. Other articles give attention to such matters as the Christian heritage and its meaning for

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the curriculum, the vocation of the scholar, and the nature of the campus community. Some of the primary publications and program developments in relation to the Christian colleges are noted in other portions of this issue.

Throughout this number, as indeed also in the Commission on Christian Higher Education itself, primary emphasis is given to certain central concepts. Three of these are particularly relevant to the Christian college; it bears each as a major responsibility. The first is academic and intellectual. While man's life shades off into other areas, it is certainly true that God intended man to be rational, i.e., to use his mind with vigor and discipline to explore the questions of the human spirit, to expose false judgments, and to define fruitful avenues of truth. At its best, the mind is alerted and moved to action as it becomes cognizant of mystery—the mystery of our life, our world, our calling of God. The academic enterprise is challenged to acknowledge this mystery and to be at work in the cause of truth. It seeks truth in the confidence that this is the vocation of the mind of man; it relates its insights into truth to the full range of our common life; and it conceives of truth not as the terminus of exploration, but as the light in which men can walk courageously and confidently toward the liberty of the kingdom of God.

The second is with regard to faith. Not only facts, but also faiths, are involved in the judgments, decisions, and reflections of men. World-views, clusters of often-hidden presuppositions, and loyalties are inextricably a part of our

life and must, therefore, be a part of true education. To deny a place to the considerations of faith in a school, classroom, or laboratory is to deprive the persons who are at work there of this aspect of their whole life. It is to strip them of the very center of their essential humanity, their resources for the integration of truth, and their dynamic for a wholeness of life. It is to undermine their basic respect for intellectual enterprise as truly relevant to life, and, thus, separating the "academic" from the "real", they emerge (even from *our* colleges and universities) as "anti-intellectuals", the anxious and embittered "half-men" who become mere puppets for totalitarian states, the frustrated and lonely beings who may "make their living" but who miss the thrilling vocation of living a whole life. The college which can take faith seriously in its total educational program to the extent of affirming a faith for itself has the opportunity of bringing scholars together in their wholeness as persons to assist them to inquire into the faiths, pseudo-faiths, and conflicting faiths by which their lives are shaped, and to send into a free society those who know that they share a responsibility for establishing deep foundations of faith. Their graduates can, in truth, affirm that the most serious threats to a person or society are always those which come from the world-views which would deny freedom, a wholesome view of man in relation to God, and an abiding center of life which is both in and beyond time and history.

The third dimension is with regard to the lives of persons and the academic

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community. The direction in which the Christian colleges are most certainly moving is toward a rediscovery of the meaning of Christian community for the college. Only within a fellowship of love and mutual respect is it possible to have persons grow into that integrity of life, sense of meaningfulness, and courageous stalwartness of thought and character for which the Christian college exists. To be sure, the Christian college is an imperfect community, composed of imperfect people. And, even the generally limited size of the college does not guarantee real community, for community belongs to the life of the spirit. It is formed when, in the power of the Holy Spirit, persons truly join one another in common growth in understanding and grace, when they truly "meet" in the search of truth, when they practice forgiveness, and when they exercise justice to realize harmony between freedom and order. Mutual respect and love opens the way for humility and service. They are, in turn, the pre-requisites for the academic community's worship of God.

When some of these marks, in their inter-relatedness, pertain on a campus, it is certainly on the way to being the campus of a Christian college. It is the

place where the praise of God is normal to the academic community, and where the concept of service is fundamental to its programs of study, action, and worship. The college and its classroom which can be such a community of persons is engaged in education at its best. It is devoted to the search of thought and life which can be both a glorification of God and a real meeting of persons. It is a microcosm of that divine kingdom in which love is unmarred by fear and truth is undarkened by the shadows of ignorance or pride. It is the kind of a college which bears its testimony to the central Christian claim, that "God was in Christ, reconciling the world unto Himself;" it is the disciple-community which seeks to serve Him, whom to serve is man's perfect freedom.

Extra copies of this number are being printed for the participants in the first Quadrennial Convocation of the Christian Colleges, Denison University, Granville, Ohio, June 20-24, 1954. These are being distributed by the Department of Christian Institutions of the Commission on Christian Higher Education, under whose auspices the Convocation is being held.

Education for Freedom: An Interpretation of the Christian College

WALTER E. WIEST



NY COLLEGE WHICH IS COMMITTED to purposes defined in some sense as Christian must face honestly the question whether Christian faith can contribute anything distinctive toward a workable philosophy of education. By "workable" I mean a philosophy that can do justice to the data and methods of the various academic disciplines and yet relate them creatively to the Christian insights which are to give focus to the academic program. As this affects the student, it will be expressed as an attempt to integrate his intellectual with his religious experience.

THE COMPLEXITY OF MAN

Christian colleges in America are part of the whole scheme of education in a democracy. Our educational thinking is centered, therefore, upon our concern for individual persons. But it is necessary in this case that we be clear as to what sort of creature this "person" is, considered from a Christian point of view, and what are his needs which ought to be met in any Christian program of higher education. We are dedicated to the education of free persons; what does this mean in terms of a Christian view of man?

We might well begin with Paul's statement in I Corinthians: "What is it then? I will pray with the spirit, and I will pray with the understanding also; I will sing with spirit, and I will sing with the understanding also."

In this passage, Paul was reacting to one extreme in religious faith, that which is exclusively emotional. It was represented here by those in the early churches who claimed to speak with tongues, uttering mysterious babblings which they held to be communications from the supernatural world but of which no one else could make any sense. Paul was well aware of a knowledge of God which goes beyond anything we can fully understand here and now. Nevertheless, he was still concerned that faith should in some way be made understandable. Man cannot live without faith; at the same time, he will always be compelled to think about his faith and to try to understand its implications for all of life.

Colleges exist because man is, in part, what Aristotle took him to be—a rational animal. He is eternally curious about himself and his world, and the program of studies at a college reflects the explorations, the twists and turns, which this intellectual curiosity has made in every area of human experience. But man is not purely a rational animal. He also has deep feelings and convictions. He is both

Walter E. Wiest, now serving as the Counselor to Protestant Students at Columbia University, was until about a year ago, a member of the faculty and Dean of Cedar Crest College in Allentown, Pennsylvania. A considerable portion of this article formed the substance of the paper which Mr. Wiest read at the workshop in the "What is a Christian College?" Research-Study Project held at Cedar Crest College during the summer of 1952, and which was one in a series of six such workshops held that summer.

EDUCATION FOR FREEDOM

head and heart, and "the heart", as Pascal said, "hath its reasons that reason does not know." So man is a believing, worshipping animal as well as a reasoning one. His essential characteristic is not simply reason, but "spirit", including a complexity of reason, imagination, aspiration, faith.

Man is a free spirit. He not only thinks; he makes judgments and decisions, he has convictions, he aspires, he strives, he has "intimations of immortality". Yet in the very exercise of his freedom, he finds that he has needs which drive him beyond himself. Not only is he fallible and prone to err. He also has a persistent inclination to corrupt his own best efforts. This is not to say that there is no good in man, but rather that he is a perplexing mixture of good and evil, in Godliness and devilishness. His freedom to think, explore, experiment, devise, has produced both the triumphs and the evils of civilization, the awesome creations and the awful destructions of history, the bloom and the blight of human life. Man is a problem to himself.

Man therefore needs God to cleanse, to renew, and ultimately to fulfill his human spirit. In the Christian view, the Cross indicates both the failure of human ventures in self-sufficiency and the ultimate fulfillment of the human spirit through the recreating love and mercy of God. True and full freedom comes as we receive, in repentance and faith, the Spirit of God which has come to us in Jesus Christ.

This view of man can be translated, I believe, into an effective approach to higher education. The aim of it should be to lead the student to confront the basic issues, the "Big Questions" in Crane Brinton's fortunate phrase, of human life in the light of Christian truth. Three years ago we prepared a statement of aims and purposes at Cedar Crest College, in which we tried to define what ought to happen in the four-year interchange between student and teacher. Among other things, we said:

To teach history is not to recite the dates and events of the past, whether of our civilization or of others. It is rather to help the student to see the drama—the magnificence and splendor, the irony and tragedy—which is human life in historical perspective, and to appreciate some of the implications of this for our own thinking about the meaning and purpose of human existence. To teach music is not to give the student merely the facts about the lives of the composers and an academic analysis of their compositions. It is to introduce her to music as a communication of the insight and expressiveness of a sensitive artist, an experience in which the listener shares the creative impulse of the composer's genius. To teach biology is not simply to require students to memorize the classifications of living forms and some of the facts about their structures and functions. It is to communicate to the student something of the adventure and satisfaction of a scientific exploration into the nature of life in its many forms, of the relations of these forms to each other and of the place of man in the whole realm of organic being.

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From this it is only one step more to lead the student to soul-searching exploration of the deepest of human experiences—the sense of awe in the presence of the universe and its mysteries, the moral conflict between insistent good and persistent evil, the fact of death and the hope of immortality. These all drive man to the limit of his resources and to a sense of deep need of an ultimate Being upon whom he can depend. The eternal quest for meaning and fulfillment meets an affirmative answer in Christian faith. In meeting human needs, we must use all of the tested knowledge and reliable techniques available to us. But we need also the inspired imagination and vision, the consuming passion and devotion, the sense of ultimate fulfillment which men find in response to the love of God.

SOME PERPLEXITIES OF EDUCATION

But such a philosophy of higher education will meet immediate objection from many quarters. It will seem to suggest some sort of educational authoritarianism. Certainly its concept of freedom will seem much too limited and biased to those who believe in an academic program in which the aim is to present all views dispassionately, objectively and with equal neutrality. Some would doubtless insist upon an ideal of “democratic” education in which the separation of religion and education is seen as the necessary corollary of the separation of church and state.

It should be made clear that this article represents no attempt to argue that a Christian philosophy is the only valid one for education, or that there is no room for others in a democratic society. Its contention is rather that there are many considerations which make a Christian approach a legitimate, fair and constructive possibility. Some of the perplexities presently confronting us in higher education suggest some very persuasive arguments to this effect.

The way is being cleared for the introduction of positive affirmations in educational philosophy, although not without conflict and confusion. On the negative side, it is widely accepted that there is no such thing as absolute, impersonal objectivity. Lionel Trilling makes the point tellingly in congratulating the author of a book upon making clear to his readers what is his “principle of relative distortion.” The fact needs no elaboration since it has been well made by a number of writers recently; one need only cite Arnold Nash (*The University and the Modern World*) as an example.

Acceptance of this fact should help educators to recognize also that there is nothing “undemocratic” or authoritarian *per se* in the benefit that man finds his fulfillment in God. It is no better defense of man’s freedom to insist that he is self-sufficient than to maintain that “all men are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights”. The view of man so far presented is an estimate of the facts of human experience. There is nothing in it to limit intellectual or scientific objectivity or to hinder free inquiry in any academic field.

Other more positive considerations are even more important. One is the in-

EDUCATION FOR FREEDOM

creasing realization that, while free inquiry is indispensable to a democratic society, a system of education must also deal with *commitments*. This is perplexing but it cannot be ignored. Freedom must finally be exercised in making a decision for something if it is to be meaningful at all. The freedom to remain forever indecisive may be useful in some phases of scientific investigation or rational analysis, but it is not the thing upon which we must rely in meeting the immediately pressing issues of life. C. S. Lewis has used an excellent figure to express the need of first principles to make even rational analysis itself meaningful: "You cannot go on 'seeing through' things forever. The whole point of seeing through something is to see something through it. It is good that the window should be transparent, because the street or garden beyond it is opaque. How if you saw through the garden too? It is no use trying to 'see through' first principles. If you see through everything, then everything is transparent. But a wholly transparent world is an invisible world. To 'see through' all things is the same as not to see." (from *The Abolition of Man*)

This is all the more pressing when we consider the matter of moral judgments and values. We hear more and more these days of the need to include moral values in our educational program, of the need for "character education." There is an increasing sense of urgency about the problems produced by the moral and spiritual revolution of our time. The situation we face was characterized well by William Temple when he compared our world to a shop window into which someone had broken overnight and put all the price tags on the wrong articles. In a crisis like this, our students need to find something to stand by, something to live for, and, if necessary, even to die for. They need to find something which can evoke their loyalty and devotion, arouse their sensitivity to human needs, provide some motive to meet these needs and some basis for making judgments about them.

It is certainly worth arguing that an educational philosophy of non-committal detachment, prone to fall into an ideal of knowledge for its own sake, cannot meet the demands being placed upon us in these days. In *The Crisis in the University*, Sir Walter Moberly expresses concern for the situation in English universities, which seems very much like our own. "Most students", he says, "go through our universities without ever having been forced to exercise their minds on the issues which are really momentous. Under the guise of academic neutrality they are subtly conditioned to unthinking acquiescence in the social and political *status quo* and in a secularism on which they have never seriously reflected—fundamentally, they are uneducated." The atmosphere in our institutions of higher learning would all too often justify Dr. Paul Scherer's remark (in a sermon) that if we were to take two such diverse persons as Nero and Paul and give each of them B. A. degrees from one of our modern universities, all we should get out of it would be more reason than ever to call our dogs Nero and our sons Paul.

In this situation, a Christian philosophy of education has something to offer.

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Admittedly, it is no simple matter to show how it can be applied practically in the organization of a curriculum. But another of the perplexities of contemporary higher education may point the way for us. It is the intensive specialization in academic fields, which threatens the disintegration of the student's educational experience as well as the life of the academic community. Karl Barth has not exaggerated the problem in saying, "We contrive for a little to be satisfied to have our knowledge split into a thousand parts, each man clinging jealously to his own fragment, the spiritual bond cast to the winds. You take your biology! You take your history! I have my religion! You in your small corner and I in mine!"

TOWARD A UNIFICATING PERSPECTIVE

In our concern for the "autonomy" of each discipline, we have not faced realistically the tendency of each specialized methodology to set itself up as the sole criterion of truth. The operationalist in psychology or sociology, e.g., despite statements that he makes no judgments about concerns which may lie beyond the reach of his method, nevertheless is constantly tempted to insinuate that such things are meaningless or irrelevant. Each specialization tends to deal with human experience largely from its own perspective, so that we are presented with psychological man, or sociological man, or economic man. One of the most common complaints about the inter-disciplinary, "general education" courses with which many colleges are experimenting is that in each section the course tends to take on the slant of the methodology in which the instructor happens to have been trained.

There is need of restoring wholeness to the educational process by basing it upon some view of man which will have both breadth and depth adequate to the fullness and richness of human experience. While it cannot be proved that a Christian view is the only option, there is a strong educational argument for a religious perspective that can include appreciation of all the dimensions seen by the specialized disciplines in addition to its own concern with ultimate questions. Certainly any philosophy that failed to include some sympathetic treatment of religious claims would be ignoring a most important dimension of the human spirit. Specialized methodologies may well be impoverished, even in their proper field of operation, by the lack of a broader spiritual context in the light of which to appraise their results; note, for instance, the interesting analysis of literary works from Christian as contrasted with naturalistic points of view in a recent issue of this journal.¹

This is no brief for theological imperialism, even in a Christian college. Each discipline must have freedom to pursue its own proper methods and interests. There is a place for the objective and critical study of religion itself as one of the disciplines. But free inquiry should be exercised with some sense of responsibility to all dimensions of human experience. It would be out of keeping with the char-

¹ Chad Walsh, "Flat Minds, Kind Hearts, and Fine Arts", *THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR*, June, 1953. Volume XXXVI, Number 2.

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acter of Christian faith to attempt to dictate a set of answers to students, but it is very much in keeping with a creative understanding of the educative process to focus the student's educational experience upon the "Big Questions" of human nature and destiny. To present Christian affirmations as possible answers to these questions is, even in a broad view, a perfectly legitimate procedure.

One thing more must be said about Christian freedom. When applied to colleges, it carries with it the *freedom to experiment*. In the present state of higher education, this is no mere hypothetical right or privilege but a pressing and practical matter for action.

I have suggested that the student's academic experience might be organized around a concern for the "Big Questions" of life, through which he can be led upon an intellectual and spiritual adventure. Karl Barth has defined secularism as an attempt to organize life apart from God; we are attempting to organize life under God.

But this calls for experiment and change. Under our present systems, the student often finds his college life schizophrenic, with his intellectual interests and religious concerns in separate spheres. His inner state is likely to be like Plato's description of the soul, a charioteer trying to hold together two struggling horses.

This is no suggestion that the Christian college indulge in hare-brained schemes or lower its academic standards. They should have no interest in producing second-rate goods. The point is rather the opposite, that wise experimentation can make their programs better. We are in a period of ferment in higher education. There is much discussion of experiment and change, most of it in the interests of better integration of some sort. The discussions of "general education", of "Great Books" curricula, and the rest are ample evidence of unrest and desire for improvement. It would be most ironic if the Christian colleges were to hold back from experimentation for fear of doing something academically unsound. Not only would they be left in the rear of educational advancement; they should also be neglecting their own genius. In Christian faith we have the basis for reorganization and integration. What is more, such faith should by its very nature give us a sense of freedom from old traditions and the letter of the law. It would be a good start to read again Paul's declarations of his new-found freedom in faith or Luther's treatise on Christian liberty.

"What is it then? I will pray with the spirit, and I will pray with the understanding also: I will sing with the spirit, and I will sing with the understanding also." God grant us the wisdom and the courage to go forward toward a program of Christian higher education conceived in this spirit.

A Symposium: Can and Should a College Be Christian

I: Defining Some Central Issues

WILLIAM H. POTEAT



THE GENERAL THEME OF THIS symposium is: "Can and should a College be Christian?" I take it to be the function of this paper to ask: First, "Is it meaningful to use the adjective, *Christian*, before the noun, *College*?" Second, "If it is meaningful, how do we know when it is properly used; what, that is, would a Christian College be?"

In addressing myself to these questions, I do not pretend to be concerned with the current usage of these words. Nor am I supposing they cannot be used in other ways than I propose to use them here. This is an essay in definition. I am suggesting that we talk in the following way!

For my present purposes I find it convenient to use the word, *college*, to refer to a community of persons united in the rational pursuit of truth. A community I shall understand to be an aggregate of individual and relatively autonomous persons who in some sense and in varying degrees have a "private" existence, a sphere of private decisions and an unassimilable personal depth; who are nevertheless bound together respecting certain goals and evaluations; who live a corporate life through the means of certain symbols or propositions expressing the general attitudes and evaluations which bind them together; into whose *identity as individuals* these symbols and evaluations of corporate life really enter; and, finally, whose life together is expressed in *particular* evaluations, decisions and acts from day to day.

I will call the ultimate evaluations (and the symbols in which they are expressed, which constitute the foci of communal existence), *First Order Decisions*. The word 'decision' is somewhat misleading in this case. One does not really *decide* upon his world-view in any detached sense. But the use of 'decision' does serve to indicate what is the case, namely, that we are related to these symbols fundamentally through *sentiment*. Among *First Order Decisions* are not merely the explicit grounds of *this* corporate life, but implicit evaluations concerning the nature of man, the meaning of history, the meaning of the 'created' world, the role of *this* community in the life of the individual who is its communicant, and its place in the process of history and culture as a whole, etc. These "decisions" are what are at times called "metaphysical presuppositions".

The particular day to day evaluations, decisions and acts of the community which has its existence through this relatively stable set of *First Order Decisions*, I shall call *Second Order Decisions*. In a highly complex and heterogeneous community, the relation among the several *First Order Decisions* is not neatly logical; and the relation between *Second Order* and *First Order Decisions* is not simply deductive. But, there is a tolerable order among the *First* and a real logical and

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psychological relation between the *Second* and the *First*; else the Community is destroyed. The ultimate decisions express the identity of the Community. The penultimate ones exhibit its fidelity to itself.

Now, if a college is a community, then like every community, it is an aggregate of persons united by certain corporate *First Order Decisions* which have some logical and psychological bearing upon their private and corporate *Second Order Decisions*. These *First Order Decisions* express not only the corporate intention of pursuing the truth rationally, but implicitly express also decisions concerning the ultimate nature and value of reason and truth, as well as attitudes, evaluations and judgments concerning the nature of the world, of man, the meaning of history, etc.—in short, an implicit “metaphysic”. I take it that no one would dispute the claim that in this broad sense of the word, there are distinguishable Christian, Marxian, and Liberal Democratic “metaphysics”. Hence, it is meaningful to use adjectives such as “Christian”, “Marxian”, “Liberal Democratic” before the noun, “College”.

So much for the first question! I have deliberately resorted to a somewhat dogmatic tone in order to get the issue clearly before us. I hasten now to introduce the qualifications that seem to be crucial, if the second question is to be relevantly considered.

II

The task of seeking the most general attitudes, evaluations and affirmations of a given individual or historic community or society is always perilous in the extreme. The spectator achieves a kind of detachment which makes possible and at times fruitful generality, but at the price of an abstractness which is at best partial, at worst a falsification, and of a selectivity which may have no more than a personal relevance for him. The participant on the other hand is able to grasp the *affective* relations between ideas not so readily available to those more interested in their logical relations, but at the cost of an immediacy in which the image of the life of the community loses all shape. One has to resort to both of these in turn with a full sense of the limits peculiar to each standpoint.

This task is complicated by at least two further facts: First, one has to seek these general attitudes, evaluations and affirmations not only in the symbols and general propositions through which a community expresses these to itself and to others, but also in the more specific decisions, actions, and evaluations of day to day existence. The relation between the latter and the former is a highly complicated one, and almost certainly not a simple deductive one. This seems to be the case both because every decision, at the time that it is made, is based upon contingencies which may render it foolish from the point of view of hindsight, which, not being involved in the decision, fails to see the problem in its concreteness, the objective towards which it was directed, and the basis upon which probabilities were calculated; and because concrete decisions always bear both more and less than a merely deductive logical relation to general evaluations on the one hand and to

probabilities on the other. Every concrete act, in other words, expresses not merely a general set of attitudes—e.g., Christian, Liberal Rationalist, Marxist—but the concrete attitudes of a community *at a given moment of decision, in all its particularity*. These may actually be a betrayal of values of a more general sort. In short, men and communities frequently act irrationally. It is dangerous therefore to move from particular attitudes and decisions to the general affirmations of a community. Communities do not always act rationally; their specific decisions do not bear a necessary and *deductive* relation to their general beliefs since the former, *at the time they are made*, are based upon contingencies. The best we can say is something like: "Given our belief (B) concerning the nature of the world in the situation (S) with characteristics a, b, c, d and possibilities 1, 2, 3, 4, we very probably ought to do X." However, even if the relation is not deductive and men are not even as logical in their actual behavior as they could be in principle, it would be absurd to suppose that there is *no* connection—either logical or psychological—between their general attitudes toward the world and their specific behavior in it. If the latter were the case, there would be nothing to which the words *community* and *society* could possibly refer, and therefore, *a fortiori*, no way of contrasting one with another.

The task is complicated in the second place, because in the nature of the subject investigated, whether one at the moment takes the standpoint of spectator or participant, one is taking up an attitude toward the general evaluations of a community from the standpoint of either the same or different evaluations, and this predisposes him to attach significance to some things and not to others. In short, the investigator is himself axiologically involved.

I introduce these elaborate and apparently gratuitous disclaimers not to disarm criticism of what I am saying, but rather in the hope that some of the, I believe, entirely irrelevant arguments between interpreters of the Christian College and between the former and advocates of some form of so-called "secular" education in a democratic society may be removed. I would not suggest that there is no issue here. On the contrary, the argument seems to me to have very great theoretical and practical import. At the same time, much confusion seems to me to derive from a failure to clear the ground of certain misunderstandings and equivocations. For example, if what I have said above does in fact hold, and there is some logical and psychological connection between specific decisions, evaluations and judgments in the life of a community and certain general attitudes and affirmations which give to that community its identity, then we must exclude entirely the limiting-case of a "presuppositionless" college, a university which is "just a university", to which the qualification Christian, Marxist or Liberal Rationalist is irrelevant. This means that in the discussion, in which educators compare the relative virtues etc. of "Christian" and "Secular democratic" colleges, they must have in mind something to which their terms refer. They clearly do not intend, in this context, to compare the architectural style of buildings, but a certain community of people,

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bound together by certain common objectives, living a corporate life more or less based upon certain ultimate evaluations, in terms of which daily decisions of policy are made and attitudes toward the world taken up with more or less logical consistency and fidelity. I wish to emphasize the qualification, "more or less".

Therefore, I do not believe there is really such a thing as a *college-or-university-as-such*, in any other than the trivial sense that despite different ultimate evaluations and affirmations, "Christian" and "Liberal Rational" universities have certain characteristics in common.

At the same time, those who recoil from the imagined implications of such a view are not unqualifiedly mistaken. Indeed, it is in the attempt to make the legitimacy of their protest plain, and thus their partial truth once again available to the discussion that I have sought to clear the ground. Doctrinaire analyses on both sides have introduced needless contentiousness into a debate in which there really are two sides.

Those who say a *college-as-such* is a pure and meaningless abstraction because every human community decides, acts, evaluates and lives its corporate life in terms of certain ultimate affirmations about the world, usually go on, in too rationalistic a fashion, to relate every element of that corporate life to these affirmations. They want to show e.g., that Liberal Rationalist presuppositions enter into the discipline of economic and chemistry, and into the mind of the teacher of economics and chemistry—or so they appear to be suggesting. The suggestion that there is "Liberal Rationalist Economics" and "Liberal Rationalist Chemistry" naturally offends the man who is quite sure his study is "objective"—i.e. free of the gratuitous intrusion of affirmations concerning the nature of the world, etc. Now, this is an extremely complicated epistemological and methodological question—one into which we must forebear to enter here. I am quite sure that the presuppositions of economics are related to a set of ultimate affirmations in a different way and to a different degree than are the presuppositions of Chemistry. In this context however I will limit myself to saying that both those who would try to say there is something called "Liberal Rationalist Chemistry" and those who would insist that "Chemistry is chemistry" and is in no way related either logically or psychologically to affirmations of a more general metaphysical order are over-simplifying.

What is very much to the point here is that the means used by those who have wished to indicate the implicit faith underlying the "Christian" college or the "secular" college have tended to over-state their case, thus at once arousing the just suspicion of their opponents and obscuring the truth in the protest of their opponents. I think we must say that every human enterprise and the existence of every human community involves either implicit or explicit "metaphysical assumptions"—that ultimate attitudes concerning the nature of the world and man enter logically and psychologically into the penultimate judgments, evaluations, decisions and actions of men and communities. If this were not so, there would be no rhyme or reason in human existence. What then, in face of this, is the truth in the protest

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of those who want to remove from before the word "college" or "university" the qualifying adjectives, "Marxist" or "Christian"—as the case may be.

Many Christian critics—and let me observe *en passant* that most of their criticism is epistemological and hence in no peculiar sense "Christian"—adopt the traditional Faith-Reason dichotomy and argue that "faith precedes reason"—hence there are no presuppositionless philosophies and Weltanschauungen—and therefore no historical communities whose rationality is not ultimately dependent upon a certain commitment of the community's affections. Now, I believe it to be true that faith, understood as the response of a community to reality, does precede reason, understood as bringing to consciousness this faith and the explication of all of its implications. But this view opens itself to attack when it supposes that the relation between faith and reason in the actual life of an individual or community is a simple deductive one from which all contingent elements can or ought to be removed. Consequently they actually argue or—more frequently—are misunderstood as arguing that the actual rational activity of a community has the same deductive relation to its own "postulates" as the conclusions of a deductive argument to its premises. This goes entirely too far, as I try to argue in my opening qualifications.

Others speak in terms of absolute presuppositions and relative presuppositions. Again the relation between the latter and the former is certainly not *merely* psychological. But neither is it neatly logical. In the concrete life of a community these relations are much more confused, the logical and psychological interpenetrate much more complexly than any simple epistemological inquiry is able to discover or express. This is particularly true of highly advanced and heterogeneous societies such as our own.

This element of contingency enters into the volitional and evaluative life of communities in two ways. A particular act of judgment and decision is based not merely upon a commitment of greater generality, but also upon circumstances which cannot in principle be known at the time of decision. We therefore cannot *know* that X is the "right" thing to do in the same deductive fashion as we know that a given conclusion to a syllogism is the "right" one. Contingency enters here. At the same time contingency enters in the very fact of man's freedom.

This contingency is one of the factors which keep a community humane. Only a Marxian-Communist society which eliminates all contingency in the concept of the dialectic of history imagines radical consistency to be possible and defines inconsistency—whether conscious or unconscious—as treason. All societies not illudined by a rationalistic prejudice expect and can assimilate, even encourage, within limits, both inconsistency and dissent. At the same time, there are always limits to this tolerance which cannot be transgressed without the society ceasing to be, even if these limits are both difficult and dangerous to define too precisely in advance and in too abstract terms. We can never say precisely how much strain can be put with impunity upon the basic principles of a society at a given moment. It

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is always dangerous to sound the alarm prematurely. Yet the tragic fact of human societies seems to be that when we are quite sure it is not too soon to sound the alarm, it is already, in fact, too late.

III

In full recognition of these reservations, we may now turn to the second question before us, namely: "What would a Christian College be?" I wish to make it quite clear that this is *not* the question: "How do we create a Christian College?" I seriously doubt that anyone can "create a Christian College," and I believe it is reckless from the point of view of culture and idolatrous from the point of view of God's sovereignty to try! We are as incompetent to "build" a Christian College as we are to "build" the Kingdom of God. We can only make specific decisions and act in a given historical context, with all the limits that it imposes upon us—including our own finiteness and sin—as men who have made certain Christian *First Order Decisions*—recognizing the contingency, relativism, ideology, anxiety, ego-centrism, infidelity, pride and fear of death that infects all our *Second Order Decisions*

Even so, I think it not impossible to formulate a limiting-concept which will express in part the "logical" structure of a community whose *First Order Decisions* are generally Christian. Therefore, I would suggest that a Christian College is a community of persons united in the rational pursuit of truth in which the dominant and effective *First Order Decisions* ultimately express the affirmation that Jesus Christ is Lord; where therefore *Second Order Decisions* and evaluations ultimately express a response to Him. To rescue this definition from a completely empty generality, we might say that a Christian college is a community where men understand themselves, the world and their own corporate life in terms of the *First Order* symbols of Incarnation, Creation, Fall and Eschatology.

Jesus Christ as bearer of *Grace* and *Truth* is the ultimate concern of the Christian College. The college is a community in which men as unitary beings encounter one another in a multiplicity of ways. Here the whole human drama unfolds. Here is evidenced the shadow of man's *Iustitia Originalis*; the fragmented but still partly viable community. Here is exhibited man's dependent—*independent* nature; his sinfulness; his existential anxieties; his fear of death and meaninglessness. Here is dramatized man's vanity, ego-centrism, pride of reason, etc. Here, in short, is man's greatness and wretchedness. Jesus Christ as the bearer of *Grace* brings illumination and healing—after he has brought judgment to this community.

But the college is a community in which men and women encounter one another uniquely, consciously, and systematically as minds, directed toward the truth. Here, Jesus Christ as the bearer of *truth* must be related as *the bearer of the Truth* to the conflict among *truths*. Here, the gospel opposes itself as *thought about the world* premised upon the event of Incarnation to other thought about the world.

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A final word concerning cultural pluralism. Pluralism is not merely a contemporary reality in American culture which we have to face. It is not merely a sociological fact-of-life with which we find ourselves forced to compromise. It is a theological fact also—a fact of creation. The world is full of a number of different things. To acknowledge the creator is to take up a *positive* attitude toward the fact of pluralism. At the same time we do not subscribe to pluralism as an end in itself, because of any tentativeness concerning the ultimacy of Jesus Christ. On the contrary, we affirm pluralism *because* we affirm the ultimacy of Jesus Christ. We subscribe to it because we are not wise enough or good enough to say with finality exactly who Jesus Christ is and what is meant by His ultimacy; and certainly not what this means in any given situation; and even *this* we know only because we confess Jesus Christ as Lord. We know, for example, that the virtues of the non-Christians are always a judgment upon Christians; and frequently mitigate the concrete evils of which Christians are the agents.

When we view our situation from the standpoint of Creation, Fall, Incarnation and Eschatology we know above all else that there is no neat correlation between our intentions and our historic successes; nor between our historic successes and the providence of God.

A Symposium

II: Christianity Not the Only Option

JOHN DILLENBERGER



EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS ARE most vital, though usually less apparently successful, when they are not monolithic in structure and outlook. Their vitality depends upon the challenge which comes from differences and upon the freedom of decision which occurs in the midst of them. This does not exclude the possibility or even desirability of an institution having a specific orientation. But it does mean that the basic philosophy cannot be foisted upon the members of such institutions. There is no surer road to tyranny over the minds of men than such imposition.

This observation is made by Christians and non-Christians alike. Christians may have a more adequate basis for this outlook than that which is afforded only by historical observation—though the latter should be sufficient to establish the relation between the thesis and the facts. Their special understanding of the subtle impulse to domination should make them suspicious of their own drives toward forcing the religious outlook upon an institution from top to bottom.

In reply, it will be said that this is hardly the danger of our own time. We are beset by institutions which are so concerned with being objective that they never take any position or give any direction. There is no unity in the curriculum nor in the extra-curricular aspects. The student is exposed to unrelated and often contradictory materials, while other aspects, such as the religious motivations and convictions of men, are excluded as unreal, dangerous, or peripheral.

This is called "secularization" of our educational institutions. It is a serious departure from the idea of a university which once assumed a single but comprehensive universe as the object of the pursuit of truth. Moreover, church-related colleges as well as independent and state schools have become the victims of this process. It is not unusual to find a church-related school in which religious dimensions have evaporated more than in the non-church school. But we should learn something from such history, *rather than praise* or lament it, depending upon our predilections. At a recent theological meeting attended primarily by college or university professors of religion (all of whom were Protestant Christian), the history of a number of educational institutions whose original orientation was Christian was discussed. There was fairly unanimous agreement that all of the institutions had become "secularized". But most everyone present felt too that he preferred to teach in such an institution rather than in a monolithically dominated one. To the rabid Christianizer of our institutions of learning, this will only be proof of the secularization of professors of religion. This too has happened,

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though I would be loathe to apply that designation to the group described above. In fact, this group was not happy with the alternatives, but felt that the ideals of education and of a university were more adequately served in the present than in the specifically Christian days. They were concerned with the place of Christianity and with a Christian college, but did not want to return to past models.

Part of the reason why even church-related colleges lost their religious dimensions is that the domination of a particularly Christian perspective had to be broken in the name of free inquiry. To be sure, "free inquiry" has now become the slogan of an outlook upon life which frequently is as dogmatic and blind as the religious orthodoxy which it replaced. That is why the cult of objectivity has been attacked by pointing out that everyone comes to problems and issues with certain premises and presuppositions, even when they are unexpressed. This is a necessary initial procedure, but hardly an excuse for everyone thereafter going his own way, or for the Christian as a result to feel free to propagate and propagandize on his behalf in the university. In either case, the search for truth has been abandoned. All that the question of presuppositions discloses is that the problem of truth lies at deeper and more difficult levels than is frequently assumed.

If the recognition that all men do have presuppositions leads to the conviction that now the search for truth has been consummated, a new period of religious domination may not be altogether impossible. We live in a "post-Christian" period and possibly in a new "pre-Christian" one. The distance to be travelled is still great, but Christianity has new openings and is beginning to make significant strides. In the light of the distance to be traversed, it may seem strange to sound warnings about a possible new period of religious domination. I am among those who insist that Christianity must be a part of the educational enterprise and am myself a product of a church-related college where religion was a vigorous option. But in the last few years, the dangers within the new trend have become more apparent. They may not repeat in detail the mistakes of the past, but they will be fearful nevertheless. I know of colleges and universities, church-related and otherwise, where a dubious Christian ethos is being forced upon the institution to the detriment of the pursuit of truth. The new outlook may not dominate the scene, but it can effectively stifle the cross-currents of thought so essential to the vitality of an institution.

II

In the light of these contemporary tendencies, as well as past history, I find it necessary in the name of Christianity to doubt that there could be or should be a Christian college or university unless circumscribed by more limitations than most Christians are willing to give. Although some church-schools have been more secular than Christian, those most alive have nevertheless profited from the fact that they have not been as specifically Christian as Christians would have liked them to be. As in the days of Israel, so in our own, God uses the labors of non-Christians for the judgment and the renewal of spirituality among Christians.

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In short, there can only be a college which is Christian if it is not too narrowly Christian. It is legitimate for an institution to state that its fundamental orientation is Christian, that its extra-curricular and curricular programs are conceived and planned from this perspective; but it will not be a college or university if this faith claim becomes either a means of neglecting other claims, or of easily disposing of them because they are theoretical and not really held by any individual whom one has to meet face to face. It would be to the detriment of the Christian cause if all faculty members of a church-related college were Christians. Insofar as I as a Christian believe that truth is most fully disclosed in Christianity and make certain confessions concerning it, I can of course ideally say that a college could and should be made up of Christians. But another side of the Christian witness is equally imperative, namely, that every Christian approach is not the whole truth, and that Christianity, in actual historical fact, has been distorted when the whole Christian truth has been claimed for any institutional or historical embodiment. As Christians, we ought to know our own corruptions. But the fact is that history—and our so-called enemies—continually have to show them to us.

This is why it is a mistake to think of a university made up entirely of Christians. Even theological seminaries are most vital when they are associated with and challenged by universities. Without a direct and living challenge, Christians either try to dominate the scene or become complacent and empty, sharing the fate of the culture. The fact that Christianity has had periods of rebirth and has repeatedly reformed itself is a confession of God's gracious work, and not an argument that total Christian expression in institutional form can be trusted. Historically, the claim for Christian expression in institutional form has always been detrimental to the spirituality of men and to Christianity itself. Christianity has been best where it was unable entirely to dominate the life it encompassed.

The vitality of Christianity, including Christian institutions, depends upon a genuine encounter with outlooks upon life which are not specifically Christian. In principle, Christians can reform their own distortion of truth. In actual fact, they need to be forced to it. Christians can confess that truth is disclosed in Christ; but they must be open to more of Christ's truth that occasionally comes from strange places. They can make affirmations of truth, but they must be open to more truth. Otherwise, they will falsify Christianity itself.

Such a combination of conviction and openness is guaranteed only in an institution which, while it has a direction, also fully encourages the tension and inquiries in the midst of which truth is found, enlarged and renewed. This demands some non-Christians who are taken seriously. We will not right the situation in which non-Christians are dogmatic and rule out religious dimensions, by making sure they are not around. Their problem was not that they were non-Christian, but that they were not open in the midst of their own convictions. We will not overcome one dogmatism by a new form of spiritual domination. This problem is not answered by having all Christian professors, but by having competent men in

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their fields, whose ableness includes an openness to truth from whatever quarter. Christian professors, particularly if they are not specifically in the field of religion, should be encouraged. But not as a panacea. Moreover, the relations which some Christian professors see between religion and their own fields is extremely dubious. There is no surer way to misunderstand the religious dimensions of the classics than to pay attention to the gods for the sake of establishing a relation, as in the Hazen pamphlet on religious perspective in teaching the classics. Further, the tendency of some to utilize religion to solve the problems within their own academic disciplines must be resisted. Hence, du Nuoy's *HUMAN DESTINY* should not be followed.

III

The unity of knowledge and the academic disciplines is an ideal. Christians believe that they are united in God and that divisions are the result of sin. But generally Christians are much too concerned to heal the sin, and in this zeal create new manifestations of it. For the vitality of Christianity, Christian institutions must be less than Christian, that sponsor non-Christian views for the sake of escaping the sin of domination or emptiness. Because Christians too are sinners, they cannot be trusted to be left to themselves. This their own message of forgiveness tells them and they ought to have the grace to accept it. Colleges will be more Christian if, in their new concern for the Christian cause, they are less anxious to be totally Christian. As Moberly has suggested, "in the present state of the world, Christians themselves ought not want an all-Christian university."¹

¹ Sir Walter Moberly, *THE CRISIS IN THE UNIVERSITY*, page 105.

A Symposium

III: Neutrality Impossible—Christian College Affirmed

ROGER L. SHINN



BRAHAM LINCOLN, ILLUSTRATING a kind of tolerance which he found intolerable, described the frontier woman who saw her husband grappling with a dangerous bear. Feeling that she ought to be involved, but reluctant to take a stand, she pointed to the extent of shouting: "Go it, husband! Go it b'ar!"

To draw a comparison with higher education is to indulge in caricature. But educators are partially responsible for such caricatures. For, while probably no college actually practices such a philosophy, some educators talk as though they did. They occasionally give the impression that the job of the college is to hire a collection of people, certified competent by advanced degrees, and turn them loose on anybody who pays the tuition, with a lusty shout of "Go it!" to all concerned.

In recent days, when nearly any college worth its salt has been accused of harboring a revolutionist or two, a counter-movement has set in. We hear that the college must inculcate traditional values and loyalties in the younger generation. Often these values are merely the local mores, defined by some organization that calls itself patriotic.

Hence this is a critical time for those who believe that education can neither assume indifference to values or become a propagandizing process. It is an appropriate time to examine the claims of the Christian college.

I

One misconception can speedily be dismissed. The question for this symposium asks whether a college *can* be Christian. In one sense it cannot. It is constantly influenced by the surrounding culture, by the demands of public relations and the expectations of contributors, and by the temptations that affect everyone. It is never a perfect Christian community. But in this strict sense the church and the individual are not Christian either.

This point is obvious, but it needs mentioning for at least two reasons. First, church colleges are tempted to claim too much virtue, as though their Christianity consisted in their good behavior. Second, critics sometimes think they demolish the case for the Christian college when they find sub-Christian conduct in such colleges. Both these errors rest on a misunderstanding of what a college can be.

There remains a meaningful sense in which a college *can* be Christian. It can have educational methods and goals which are consciously influenced by Christian faith. That influence affects at least three aspects of the educational program: the curriculum and instruction, the specifically religious activities, and the over-all community life (including counseling, student-faculty relations, social events, athletics, and all the rest).

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II

The educator in a Christian college can put his case in a nutshell, as follows: *I believe in the truth of Christianity. I believe that the Christian can welcome and assimilate the truth that comes from other sources—from classical culture, from experimental science, from anywhere else. I believe that Christian truth can illuminate and deepen all truth.*

So brief a statement is necessarily inadequate. The trouble is that many propagandists make the same claim for their particular forms of "truth."

Hence the Christian educator, without relaxing his beliefs, must have a special concern lest he become a propagandist. He needs to continue with two more statements:

1. *However much I believe in Christian truth, I do not believe that my own (or my college's) version of Christian truth is the whole truth and nothing but the truth.* Any such intellectual arrogance needs correction from a Christian sense of humility and sin. The correction may come from those Christians and non-Christians who disagree with me.

2. *Although I believe in Christian truth, many non-Christians sincerely think I am wrong.* Any honest educational process will let students see these alternatives and make their own studies and decisions. If I hold my faith insecurely, I will be tempted to hide alternative possibilities from my students. *The more secure I am, the more willing I will be that students see the alternatives as boldly and as cogently as they see the Christian outlook.*

These considerations lead some Christian scholars to say: "Christianity in the academic community should ask only a fair hearing—something denied it in many schools. The Christian has as rightful a place on the faculty as the humanist or rationalist or economic determinist; but it is educationally unsound for the college to commit itself to a single belief."

It remains, then, to state the case, not only for Christian scholarship and teaching, but for the Christian college.

III

The key to the problem is the fact that *the college as such is never simply neutral.* A college is not just an intellectual community. Along with knowledge it transmits methods of analysis, attitudes, loyalties, critical perspectives, values, and—beneath all the rest, a faith.

This fact is not always obvious. Diversity may be so great that no effort can formulate the faith of a given school. But this means only that the faith is incoherent—not that it is non-existent. Of course, the faith often is not imposed upon everyone. (It should not be in a Christian school.) It may be only an uneasy compromise within the curriculum committee or administrative council. But the impact of the college is affected by some conception of human nature and goals, of the function of education, of the idea of a healthy life, of the world's needs and their possible answers.

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The issue is not solely moral. For example, one famous school has offered a course in the new game of three-dimensional chess. One can easily imagine that such a subject might be as intellectually demanding as calculus. Yet I hazard the guess that such a course will not become part of the core curriculum at many colleges. Why not? Because some criterion other than a purely scholarly one is at work—a criterion reflecting a conception of scholarship, tradition, community approval, economic advantage, or personal realization. The criterion may be undefined, but it rests—like democracy and religion and the commitment to the career of teaching—in some sort of faith.

Thus *institutional* plans and decisions and influences, as truly as personal ones, reflect the orientation of the institution. Often the implicit faith is far more effective than the declared one. (Hence many a professor of religion might wisely wish he could trade in the whole department of religion for a chance to influence the tacit religious assumptions behind a core course or a policy of the deans.) Whether the formal affiliation be with a church, a state, or a self-perpetuating board of directors, the school may turn out a high percentage of alumni with primary loyalty to dear old Siwash's football team, to Republicanism or Socialism, to ideals of free inquiry, or to salvation through psychoanalysis. It may graduate a large proportion of snobs, anti-Semites, five-percenters, soldiers, nondescripts, public servants, artists, or missionaries. One major cause will be the faith—recognized or unrecognized—of the community.

Of course, some colleges proclaim that they offer the opportunity to choose from a variety of competing viewpoints. True. But hardly anyone is fooled by the expansive language. Obviously any wide-awake college presents varied alternatives—some church colleges more than some state schools. But some underlying philosophy or faith—if not some fear—guides the very choice of the alternatives included.

Hence I should think a college would be at an advantage if its faith is not *vague* and *inchoate* but is *acknowledged* and *coherent*. (These pairs of adjectives are *not* synonyms respectively for *broad* and *narrow*; in some cases they might be, but the reverse might equally well be true.)

Then, I should think, even the mythical "neutral" educator would say that among the many possible faiths, some colleges might well choose the Christian faith. And I should think many a teacher or student might be glad to teach or study in a Christian college.

IV

Critics often point to two dangers in the Christian college. I hope they continue to do so, because every institution needs criticism. These dangers are *real*; and although the Christian faith itself offers correction for them, external criticism may help too.

The first danger is that of a conventional piety which dulls imagination and confuses Christian ideals with comfortable bourgeois ideology. Emerson said

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that colleges hate geniuses just as convents hate saints. A cynic might draw the conclusion that the Christian college has the unique opportunity to hate both the genius and the saint.

It is true that both genius and saint are likely to be unconventional. If the prevailing conventions of a community are repeatedly labeled Christian, the real scholar or real Christian may challenge the conventions and appear to be unchristian, while the mediocre, rut-bound person "leads a good Christian life." No doubt some parents, selecting a church college for their daughter in the hope that there she will not become pregnant before marriage, are shocked if she discovers there something of the demands of Christian faith.

Needless to say, the answers to this danger are all in the New Testament. If the humanist or Marxist reminds the church college of those dangers, he serves the Christian Gospel.

The second danger is the threat to academic freedom, which is always latent or real in any educational community. Ideally, this is no problem. I have already said that the Christian welcomes truth, whatever its source, and that he wants to examine competing claims to the truth. At its best his faith should be a better guarantor of academic freedom than most alternative faiths.

For example, almost every school has a few "gods" so "sacred" that no one dares defy them. Take some examples: a bid to the Rose Bowl, the fraternity system, a sacrosanct tradition of initiations, departmental autonomy, Dewey's educational philosophy, the virtues of democracy, preprivileges of faculty rank. A given school may deify none of these, but sooner or later one finds something that just isn't challenged, whether in classroom or faculty meeting.

Christian faith denies the deity of any of these gods. All of them may be investigated and criticized. The only finally sacred thing is that God who judges all our idols, including our theologies and philosophies. He denies us no freedom, not even the freedom to question Him; for He prefers, according to our faith, honest doubt to hypocritical belief.

Actually, of course, academic freedom is not so clear a reality. Human institutions are always tempted to declare their particular ways and prejudices sacred. The facts are clear that the church has sometimes suppressed free and honest inquiry. So the Christian college does need to stand alert to the dangers of subduing freedom.

But, on this level of practice, the dangerous threats today are scarcely from the churches. It was in a great private university that a board member demanded to know whether an appointee was a "New Dealer." It was of a state university that a prominent newspaper publisher wrote: "If the state is willing to spend this money it has the right to control what is taught and what is done at the university." It was at another state university that a notorious "gag rule" drove off campus a "radical" speaker, who was then welcomed to the platform of a nearby church college.

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V.

A Christian college is a community of scholars who share a Christian faith, hope, and love. In such a community persons may find breadth of outlook, depth of insight, sympathetic appreciation for differences of opinion, unfettered educational opportunities.

Clearly no such college exists. Some come close enough to deserve the loyal efforts that sustain them.

A Symposium

IV: Adequacy of Knowledge and Christian Intelligence

CHARLES E. SHEEDY



THE IDEA OF THE SYMPOSIUM seems to be to discuss from several different and perhaps divergent viewpoints an aspect of a problem which is engaging much thought and writing in these times. It may be described generally as the problem of freedom and order (or if you like to see a dilemma, the problem of freedom *versus* order).

It is not at all a problem of words. It has behind it the institutional and social history of the last four hundred years at least. The pendulum of social action is said to swing gradually back and forth, so that one or the other of these values enjoys a favorable position from time to time, while the other falls into the shade. Thus feudalism is sometimes said to have been good for order and bad for freedom, and liberalism the other way around. The social climate, the "spirit of the age", with all of its multitudinous relevant and irrelevant factors, is said to preside over this gradual shifting back and forth of ascendancy. We think that emergency is a factor: when the people must be rallied, freedom tends to be swallowed up. We saw this in the war, and in the "war of the peace" that followed the war.

It is undoubtedly the part of wise statesmanship in every institution to support both values, to make exclusive option of neither. This is one area in which the "either/or" of Kierkegaard must be inoperative. We have seen in our own times the option for order disastrously made by Hitler and Mussolini and by the rulers of Soviet Russia. Maybe the single most urgent social problem of our day is to preserve our freedom in the midst of a continuing and quasi-permanent emergency.

The discussion of the "Christian college" seems far removed from these vast political and economic considerations. But basically the problem is all of one piece, and the educational discussion may be more significant than it looks because through it the minds of young people are influenced more than they are through the wider considerations.

At any rate the educational discussion is lively and has provoked much expression from all sides. At least ten years ago, a symposium on "The Democratic Spirit and Scientific Faith" was held at Columbia, and the "authoritarianism" of Catholic education was soundly whacked in one paper after the other. A counterpart to this, under Catholic auspices, was in a symposium on "Secularism", edited by Mr. Ross Hoffman, and having such contributors as Dr. Gerald B. Phelan and Father Francis Connell. The debate over religion in the schools, with its constitutional and juridical implications, gave impetus to the discussion; and in this connection we think of the article of Professor Corwin in "Thought" and of the book by Dr. Henry P. Van Dusen, *God in Education*.

In my opinion, of course, the proponents of Christianity in education have had

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all the best of it throughout the discussion. Father Leo Ward, in *Blueprint for a Catholic University*, has written frankly of the deficiencies of the Catholic higher learning, as well as of its values and objectives. And Professor Maritain has discussed the problem with his accustomed purity of thought and nobility of expression in *Education at the Crossroads*. Mr. Christopher Dawson has written many books and articles on Christian culture, and Professor Dietrich von Hildebrand has written concerning a point which is emphasized in this paper.

Undoubtedly the most influential expression of the Christian viewpoint has been that of Sir Walter Moberly in his *Crisis in the University*. In this book Sir Walter effectively exposed the neutralist fiction by pointing out that if you exclude religion and theology from the schools you thereby teach that nothing can be known about God, or at least that what can be known does not matter very much. Among Protestant writers, President Howard Lowry of Wooster, Dr. Van Dusen, and Dr. Arnold S. Nash have written with eloquence and force. At the same time, I think it is not too unfair to say that the most influential expression of the secularist viewpoint is to be found in the writings of Mr. Paul Blanshard.

A great experience for me during the years 1951-1952 was that of participating in the research project "What is a Christian College?" which was sponsored by the National Council of Churches and directed by Dr. Raymond F. McLain. Some three hundred "Christian" or "church-related" colleges, Catholic and Protestant, took part in many discussions in many parts of the country. I suspect that the present symposium is closely related to this research project.

During those discussions on the Christian college, the word of all words most frequently used (I thought) was "commitment", and I imagine that the ideas connected with that word will bring us to the center of the problem. It is presumed that a "Christian college" makes some sort of "commitment"—to a "point of view", a "faith". Does this "commitment" mean that some sort of order is necessarily imposed on the teachers and learners in the college? Is this so to such an extent that the function of *inquiry* which the college professes is necessarily changed to a process of compulsory verification of positions anteriorly held on "faith"? And again, does "commitment" vitiate the *teaching* function of the college, by substituting for it indoctrination in the approved and "official" position of the college?

II.

I see my job in the symposium as one of attempting to tackle these questions—and their implications—as a "responsible Roman Catholic-Christian educator", "from the standpoint of a Thomistic interpretation of truth and revelation," developing the "assets and liabilities of this position in reference to freedom and objectivity".

I will say, then, that the objective of *inquiry* in a Catholic college is "adequacy of knowledge"; and the objective of *teaching* is "the formation of the intelligence as Christian".*

*Ward, Leo R., *Blueprint for a Catholic University*, St. Louis, (Herder), 1949, p. 102.

Adequacy of knowledge I take to mean simply this: That in the Catholic college the philosophical and theological inquiry must have the preeminence—not *pro forma*, not in the sense that the two “departments” of theology and philosophy are locally present, occupying space in the required list of studies, but—a real preeminence, hierarchic and architectonic.

If the Catholic college is to exist as Catholic, the other inquiries simply must not be pursued in isolation from each other and from the architectonic wisdom. We are all familiar with the idea, explicitly professed by many, and obediently assumed by many more, that the mathematical-empirical is the only true way to knowledge. There is no attempt here to undervalue painstaking empirical research; it is indispensable, and it must go forward in every college, whether it possesses a “faith” or not. But the equation of this type of inquiry with knowledge itself is erroneous even in the investigation of matter, and disastrous in the study of man, his nature and destiny, his history and institutions, and his art.

Imitation in this respect is the trap that lies in wait for the Catholic college. There is the perfectly natural wish to be respected by the secular colleges in the areas that they recognize and admire. Again, the secular graduate schools, focusing on the empirical-mathematical, ignoring the unifying wisdom, have trained many of the leaders of the faculty in the Catholic college, and these men tend sometimes to reproduce the training they have received. And lastly, the departmental system tends to isolate philosophy and theology from the rest of the program, and the prized hierarchy of knowledge may become a dead letter, effective only in an eloquent passage of the college bulletin. Insofar as the Catholic college permits the functioning hierarchy, the overreaching wisdom, to become inoperative, and specialization to predominate factually, to that extent is the Catholic college secularized.

Philosophically, the Catholic college makes one powerful commitment: to the capacity of intelligence to know reality. In this view truth is not seen as instrumentalist or pragmatistic, but as an actual coming into contact of the intelligence with reality. Intelligence exists to know being, and all that it can know is being, either in general and diffused notion of being itself or in one or another of its modes that are ultimately reducible to being.

This reaching out of the mind towards being in its various modes gives credence, I think, to the claim that the object of inquiry in the Catholic college is “adequacy of knowledge” even on the philosophical level. The “bond of being” makes it possible for intelligence to know God: as existing, as distinct from the world, as infinite and eternal, as the beginning and end of all things—a body of knowledge of (I need not say) the highest value, available to intelligence itself without the need of revelation or the aid of faith. In this view the capacity of intelligence to know reality—even the reality of God—saves the knowledge of God from the taint of subjectivism and symbolism. And at the same time our frank affirmation that intelligence cannot know God in the infinite mode in which He

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possesses His own being avoids the opposite error of a crude anthropomorphism, of a God created in our image. There is no intrusion upon the mystery of God in His own inaccessible self-existence.

"Adequacy of knowledge" then, because this is a way of knowing that opens reality, and all of reality, to the inquiring mind. At the same time, the other ways of knowing are not neglected. The experimental-empirical-critical-mathematical, yes, and the philosophical intelligence must be able to manipulate the empirical data with accuracy and confidence. And the poetic experience must be present too: a way of knowing it is, but not simply a product of the intellect. "It is a seeing, a grasping, a knowing, but a knowing involved with our appetites and emotions, whereas the scientific effort is one merely or simply of intelligence."*

Theologically, the claim to "adequacy of knowledge" is strengthened, I think, by the opening up to intelligence of all of the new truth that has come through divine revelation. Here revelation is seen as a real communication from God to the socialized intelligence of mankind. This communication was made by God over many thousands of years to the patriarchs and prophets and through them to us. Again, no anthropomorphism, no "chats in Paradise", but the important thing is the reality of the communication from the mind of God to the intelligence of man. It was concluded in the revelation which came to us through Jesus Christ, who as God-Man is both the Mediator of revelation and its source. And "faith" is the response of intelligence to this revelation.

If divine revelation is a fact of human history, no knowledge can claim to be adequate without consideration of it. For by means of revelation intelligence is made aware of most profound realities which would have remained forever unsuspected without it. The divine mysteries—of the Trinity, of the grace of man and the fall, of the Incarnation and Redemption—are objects of knowledge eminently worthy of consideration in themselves and moreover they ought to influence lesser knowledge at every stage. For the revealed realities are not to be passively accepted and treasured. Intelligence must work with these realities—the task of theology—must compare, contrast, penetrate, understand to the human limit. Also the revealed wisdom must be ordered vitally together with all secular learning, with the ancient classics and with the newest scientific achievements, with the discoveries of history, and with all new visions in creative literature and the arts.

Not too much control, but too much modesty may be the most serious liability of theology in the Catholic college—the modesty of departmentalization. If theology is just another department on a plane with the others; if it merely goes over and over its own subject matter, bearing down forever on the achieved, on the already known; if it fails to move always towards new perspectives and new inferences—it will not succeed in this job of unifying intellectual life from its summit of human achievement.

I said that the objective of inquiry in the Catholic college is "adequacy of

*Brennan, Thomas J., *Catholic Colleges—Prologue to Revision*, Notre Dame, Indiana, (unpublished MSS), p. 28.

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knowledge", and that the objective of teaching is "the formation of the intelligence as Christian". I have tried to develop the first of these as well as I could; now I move on to the second.

III

The "Christian intelligence", then, but first of all intelligence.

"The particular concern of the college is intelligence and the things of intelligence, knowledge and the ways of knowledge. If this is so, any deviation from that concern, any attempted substitution for it is, it seems, wrong for the college, however otherwise worthy it may be."*

Some of these substitutions are religious piety, "goodness," "character-building," "the whole man," and where they exist they necessarily create some confusion regarding ends.

I am sure that the Christian colleges assume more responsibility for the moral life of their students than the great municipal and state universities do. This is so first of all because they are generally smaller, almost always residential, and because they form a fairly close-knit community. But most of all because they have a "faith".

The moral concern is right and necessary of course, but in a secondary role: it belongs to the college community as community and not as college. If it becomes predominant (sometimes I think it is the first concern in the minds of parents) the intellectual concern will inevitably deteriorate. Mr. Hutchins in his latest book says that the "custodial" system replaces the educational, and the faculty becomes a group of "adolescent-sitters". As long as the boys and girls "behave themselves", as long as there is no "trouble", everything is thought to be all right and the academic programs move along in their accustomed uncritical routines.

There are two areas, however, in which the concern for intelligence and the concern for "life" mingle and cross. One is the virtue of prudence and the other is liturgical worship.

It is impossible to teach moral virtues in a "practical-practical" way, so as to produce, as it were, honesty, and justice, and chastity in the learner. And we know that intellectual virtues do not make good men, but good artists or good scientists who may be bad men. But prudence is an intellectual virtue with a difference: it is a matter of right judgment (an intellectual habit), but of right judgment aimed towards right action; and it can provide at least "speculative-practical" standards for the guidance of a student's personal and social life. Prudence can and should enter into the intellectual experience of the student; not only in the class on ethics, but also as giving a philosophical perspective to the social sciences which without the study of prudence can teach us nothing of what societal living should be.

And liturgical worship is a way of religious life and prayer, but it is a way of knowing as well. The Mass, the liturgical seasons and the feasts—even the art

*Brennan, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

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and gesture of the liturgical actions—are a day-by-day learning experience in the profundities of the mystery of Redemption. In a college where theological science and liturgical life exist in vital connection two great values are achieved: a religious knowledge on a par with the other branches of study, and a piety which is established on doctrine.

These are leads, then, towards what I think a Christian intelligence might be: intelligence first of all the primary concern of the college; prudence as giving perspective to the “practical” and social studies; and liturgical worship as a way of knowing which brings together all religious knowledge in the outgoing movement of prayer.

What is left? I imagine I can only return to the beginning and say that the Christian intelligence is one which first of all is able to relate the various sciences and specialties to each other in the vision of being-as-analogous; and finally to relate all human knowledge to the highest reality, the reality of God as known by reason and revelation. The direction of instruction in the Catholic college should be towards the achievement of that kind of intelligence. The mathematical-empirical, exclusively conceived, is the adversary; over-specialization and departmentalization, whether of the creeping or galloping type, break down the unity of knowledge and introduce confusion.

IV

Well, then, where do we stand on “order” and “freedom”, on “point of view” and “objectivity”? I should say that the Catholic college makes two commitments which induce an order. The first of these is to a realistic theory of knowledge, the capacity of the intelligence to reach truth as reality distinct from the mind. And the second is to revelation as a real communication from God to the collective intelligence of mankind. Grant that these two commitments represent a “point of view”, a framework in which freedom must be exercised. But I don’t think it is necessary to apologize for having a point of view, especially since I am convinced that “no point of view” is itself a point of view. Neutralism, scientism, relativism, positivism—the tightest of straitjackets imposed on intelligence. They reduce all ways of knowing to one, and they reduce the dimensions of knowledge to their narrowest: the area of number and mass. These viewpoints have little faith in intelligence and I fear must produce learned skeptics not educated men.

And all the rest is freedom: for the intelligence to move towards adequacy of knowledge in the unity of Being. The great asset of this viewpoint is that no aspect of reality, even the most profound, is considered as forbidden or unapproachable. The Christian intelligence is free to search the deepest things, and to attempt to reduce bewildering diversity to one single vision. The liability is that Catholic researchers and teachers might fail to use their freedom, perhaps because of imitation, at least through an unconscious absorption of a secularist mode of thought.

But the point of view itself is sound, I think, aimed at adequacy of knowledge in inquiry, and the formation of the Christian intelligence in instruction.

Are Our Universities Big Enough?

CONRAD BERGENDOFF



ARE OUR UNIVERSITIES and colleges big enough? In asking this question I am not thinking of enrollments, or budgets, or plants. In these matters our institutions of higher learning are the biggest in the world. Unfortunately none of them in themselves make for great schools. In comparison with the dimensions of life itself, how big are they? Do they meet the deepest needs of humanity, or the highest purposes of man? Are they as broad as life—or do they serve only certain classes of society or certain segments of life?

To ask this question is to stumble immediately on the problem of the place of religion in education, or for that matter, in culture as a whole. The university is oft-times thought of as a reflection of society, the institution by which the older generation seeks to transfer its experience and judgment and taste to a younger generation. When, therefore, the college omits religion in its transmission of culture, it but reflects the fact that society has already made this omission. But the college and university are also critics of civilization, guardians of what is precious, guides of those who need counsel. The university must be challenged as to the omission of religion on the basis of its claim to be a witness to the Truth. If religion is essential to truth then it is falsehood not truth which is being served when religion is left out in the definition of truth. Then certainly our institutions are not big enough for the life of mankind.

Until very recent times education in the Western world, and in large parts of the Eastern, has been under the aegis of religion, specifically, the Christian religion. Augustine was the master of the early Middle Ages. The later Middle Ages produced the universities, where the teachings of Aquinas encompassed all human learning. We need not here make more than allusion to the role played by the Church and the Orders in molding the thought of centuries. Nor need any distinction be made here between the great churches. For the followers of Luther and Calvin carried on the tradition, and their influence dominated not only the newer universities of Europe but gave form to the first universities in America. Education extended its roots, under religious influence, to the homes of the common people, and the catechism became an almost universal text book. Religion and education became inextricably interwoven in all Protestant lands as well as in Roman Catholic. The schools of Western civilization grew up in the shadow of cathedral and of monastery and of chapel.

One of the most significant facts in the history of our culture is the comparatively recent breaking away of education from the Church. The expansion of human knowledge especially through the spectacular success of the natural sciences in the past century seemed to make all older patterns inadequate or irrelevant. The Church seemed to be a preserver of the Past and unable to comprehend within its structure

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either the new forms of learning or the new forces of social life. Where its claims were not challenged, they were probably respected but none the less by-passed as the energies of men created communities which no longer centered around the church. In France this decision grew out of the French Revolution. In the United States the great State universities developed after the Civil War as the wide areas of the West called forth new attempts to master a land rich in natural resources. In Germany the sciences received no welcome in the universities and took revenge by establishing technical institutes which paid no attention to philosophy. Everywhere the rise of industrial classes led to demands for a broader base of education and for participation by the masses in the fruits of invention and commerce. The Church was not prepared for an extension of schools which even a state could not afford when it came to be more deeply influenced by the newer classes. And all the time a revolution was going on in the way men thought of themselves, their origin, their destiny, their rights, their responsibilities. In the ferment of the times religion was not emphasized, rather was pushed aside. It was even interpreted as but a stage in man's development, a necessary step on the ladder of progress, but to be discarded when higher levels had been reached. Two world wars somehow knocked the basis away from the ladder, but in the midst of the ruins it is not yet clear that religion is anything else than one of the casualties.

Yet, in viewing the trends of our day, we must note that some of the most effective voices today in the field of the spirit have challenged modern man to re-think his rejection of not primarily the Church, but religion itself. Indeed the man who has most profoundly affected modern theology and philosophy was a solitary figure who could use as scathing terms in his denunciation of the Church as any hostile critic might employ against religion itself. Kierkegaard brought even the Church under the judgment of a God who was not to be neatly classified by the intelligence of man. In his subtle, insistent, ironic way, he placed all the idols of modernity before the awful majesty of His Existence who gives meaning to every other being, and placed the Great "I am" above all our smaller affirmations. Karl Barth has carried out something of the theme of the Unknown God, who yet determines our knowledge, and Reinhold Niebuhr has stressed the ethical result when all men's relativities are judged in the light of the absoluteness of God. We are recalled thus to a new dimension in human life, and religion reappears as a responsibility of man before his Creator. Nations and tyrants and alliances of nations are not supreme in their authority. Man is not his own. He must give an account of himself before a higher tribunal than any constituted in this world. Theologians speak of it as an "eschatological" sense. The term means "the last things", though the reference is less to time than to quality. It is before the ultimates that we stand. There are ultimates—not of our own making or choice. Those ultimates can no more be avoided than the *Ananke* of the Greek tragedians, though in Christian thought the ultimate is not a blind, cruel, inevitable Fate, but the will of God who has chosen to reveal so much of His purposes as will enable

us to escape destruction of ourselves and of society, if we are willing to hear His Word. History, in this view, is neither a senseless repetition nor a meaningless sound and fury, but the drama (Aulen) in which God seeks to save man from the forces he himself sets in motion to his own destruction, and to develop within him the resources for a new kind of existence.

As if sensing the struggle in which they stand to overwhelming and conspiring forces in modern life, the churches of a large part of the world have given evidence to our generation of a new sense of unity. The ecumenical movement had its origins in the very years when the first World War shattered the dreams of men that mankind was on its way to peace and unity. Gathering momentum in the years between the wars this movement has brought the churches closer together than ever before and proved a bond uniting Christians even in the darkest days of the Second World War. And in coming together these churches have discovered that they have a responsibility for social life within their nations and for relations between nations. They find that the unprecedented missionary efforts of the 19th century ("The Great Century"—Latourette) have made them neighbors to the peoples of the East. They have given leadership in the movement emanating in a World Bill of Rights. At Oxford and Edinburgh in 1937 and at Amsterdam in 1948 these churches have proclaimed a new determination to enter into the problems of the age and to bring the power and light of their Gospel to bear upon them.

Thoughtful men today realize that to set State and Church over against each other is itself an evidence of the crisis in which society finds itself. It solves no problems, it does confuse the issue. For State and Church are not mutually exclusive entities. The same person can be in both or in some cases opposed to both. Historians remind us that in the Middle Ages the conflict was not between two rival societies, but between two sets of officers within the same society. The opponents of the Church in our more recent times, have, willingly or unwillingly, done more than resist an institution of society. They have eliminated *religion* from the interests of a citizen in society. Thereby they have done the State no service, for they bring to the service of the State a citizen who has disinherited himself from his heritage and who has disavowed his responsibility to those standards by which both citizen and states are to be judged. I am not now interested in the relationship of Church to the State, which may be variable, depending on time and circumstances, but I am, as an educator, intensely interested in the relation of citizenship and religion. When we make Church and State antithetical we go on to put the schools of the Church over against the schools of the State and thus fatefully split our life.

An attempt is today being made to construct societies apart from all religion. This is true of course of Communist states which are avowedly atheistic and whose opposition necessarily extends beyond the church as a religious institution to the schools of the church. It applies also, I fear, to those people, still a minority, in our own country who believe that the separation of Church and State

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means an education by the State without any reference to religion. And when this fact is coupled with the irresponsibility of the State which follows from the rejection of religion, and with the widening control by the state of its citizens, I cannot see how we can logically come to any other conclusion than the philosophy on which Communism itself rests. When power is relieved of control it stops short of nothing but its own deification. It is in the nature of man that he cannot live without a god. His choice is limited to the kind of god he will serve. In the spiritual realm of today there is no greater question than the character of authority we choose to recognize. The answer determines the purpose of education.

In the larger view the churches themselves must be judged by their faithfulness in maintaining the function they are given in society. In Christian civilization that function has been to reveal the full scope of human life. Machiavelli once wrote: "We Italians must primarily thank the Church and the priests that we have become godless and wicked." This sentence can be applied to any Church and any teachers who fail to witness by precept and by life to a revelation of something more than human. I would hold that this is a combination of the Hebraic-Christian and the Graeco-Roman elements, and that in this tradition there are criteria by which we may know what is the nature, the capacities, the limitations, the rights, the privileges, the destiny of man. Education cannot forfeit this heritage without returning man to a condition which is less than human. Using a phrase of a recent writer, we cannot "resign from the human race", and we would be seeking to resign if we rejected the ultimates by which our relativities are measured. We must find a way even in the modern State to teach *its* limitations and *its* responsibilities. And this implies a knowledge of the Power to which it is responsible and the Will and Purpose by which our freedom is qualified.

Modern experiences have added to the dimensions of humanity. There is something new in the spiritual atmosphere of our age, and it challenges education in a manner unprecedented in its history.

Various terms might be used to describe this phenomena, but each is liable to misunderstanding because of associations which have gathered around it. "Democracy" is the word most favored in our country. In Europe the term "socialism" has wide currency. In some quarters the concept of "the masses" is usual, in others "the common man", or merely, "the people." But whatever the designation, the reference is to a world-wide emergence of the hitherto considered "lower classes" and their demand for a participation in the social and cultural goods of life. There is a revolt abroad against the aristocratic elements which have benefited most from education in earlier periods. So mighty is this upsurge that some have feared that it means the overthrow of all that hitherto has been cherished and nourished.

Carl Sandburg, in America, has coined a title which, it seems to me, suggests the mood in which we should meet this revolution, namely, "The People—Yes". This modern Walt Whitman has sensed the ferment which underlies the movement of the masses, and given classic expression to a spirit which recognizes a brother

in every man. Of course this revolt is not the first. Something of it appeared in the times of the Roman Graechi, in the Peasant's Revolts of the Middle Ages. It appeared with insistent pressure in the English and the American Revolutions and with explosive power in the French Revolution. It smouldered as an underground fire in the Europe of the 19th century and has broken out in flames all over the East in the 20th century. This gigantic force has been captured by various masters in various regions, but no one yet can guess what the ultimate outcome will be. Uncontrolled power has been unleashed in every quarter of the globe. Men's hearts tremble as they ponder what might happen.

These peoples seek knowledge. And simultaneously mass methods are discovered to overcome their illiteracy. They want to read, and their actions will be determined by what they read and hear and see. For the radio and the film are new tools which are at their disposal no less than are the older methods available for the traditional agencies of education. They brook no opposition based on inherited notions of class privilege. We have discovered in the American Army Tests that the truck-driver and the plumber's apprentice has as much intelligence as the professor or the banker's sons. We cannot go on limiting educational opportunities only to those whose family has wealth enough to send their son to school. The eminent president of Harvard University has pleaded that we do not consider only those fit for education who have a certain economic status. The democratic spirit obliges us to see a man for what he is and not for what his ancestors have been. Education must not only conserve the riches which have been. It must also conserve the human potentialities now existing all around us.

Over a century ago a Danish educator caught the vision of what a people could become, even a poor and war-racked nation. Grundtvig in a remarkable manner connected his compatriot's past with their future, and their potential capacities with their natural resources. His folk schools were a prophetic note in modern life. Both the individual and the habitat were rich in promise for the teacher who would understand the heritage of the fathers and turn the daily routine of life into culture of body and soul. He released in his people undreamed of energies and transformed a poverty-stricken country into a land of happiness and bounty.

In the story of education the great teachers are not they who have thought of their cultural possessions as a treasure to be hoarded and guarded for the advantage of a few, (e.g., T. S. Eliot), but as they who have brought to unlimited numbers the gifts of humanity which were not theirs before.

Communism has exploited the new social forces of our century and made its peoples believe that all the old treasures must be destroyed and on ground cleared of the Past a new and happy society will be established. We in the West consider this a deceptive and vain policy, cloaking malicious and unscrupulous motives. But the best thinkers of the West believe that the peoples of the world will find their happiness only when they build on foundations which have eternal validity. Truth will be no less the Truth if it be shared by the millions, and even more the

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Truth than when it is hoarded by a choice few. Christianity has taken over the Old Testament principles of justice and mercy, and has absorbed the Greek creative genius and the Roman conception of super-national law. Its founder and Lord never taught that the light of Truth and the bounties of Nature belonged to a small group of spiritual or economic or political elite. In fact the flames that now consume the class distinctions everywhere were to no small degree lit by His Gospel. Every coin that bore the image of Caesar might be recalled to the imperial treasury. But every human being bears in himself an image of His Maker, who demands an accounting of its use. His conception of humanity was that of a universal family, where each has obligation to the other and where the least, the children—the primary objects of education—are the greatest. Not class against class. Not nation against nation. Middle walls of partition had no place in his house of humanity. His is still the most powerful incentive in the world for the unity of mankind.

I believe that this is the undercurrent of the spiritual experience of our day. Readers of Arnold Toynbee will remember what a place he gives to this integrating power of religion as he discusses the possibility of the survival of our civilization. And I find this note too in the very recent report of the Commission on Reform of German higher education (1948), which speaks of "the necessity of making truly cultured, socially and civic-minded persons out of the young academicians, and of bringing them to a consciousness of the ultimately religious foundations of life in society. Without deep ethical obligation all human work and the progress of learning is in peril of ending in Hybris (insolence) and of becoming a victim of self-annihilation." We are yearning for a unity which does not forfeit the light by which preceding generations have been led, and by which our own present ardor has been kindled. Mankind wants a unity which does not exclude whole masses of the population from that which makes humanity. The peoples of the earth are striving for a unity which makes them brothers and not mortal enemies of each other. Man's deepest quest is for a unity with the fundamental principles of his own being in its relationship to the Author of life. Can education meet these universal and ultimate needs of the contemporary world?

Both the Church and the American college and university are being profoundly challenged by the new world of our own century. A university that seeks only to conserve the Past is not big enough for this age. A Church that cannot see the Gospel in a setting different from that of any previous age runs the risk of being irrelevant to our time. Any university has the well-nigh incomparable job of relating the knowledge of the Past to the experience of the Present. A university of the Church has the still more arduous task of relating the Gospel to the knowledge of the Present and preserving what remains true from the Past. It has the further duty to construct a view of society in which both Church and State have their place, in which culture and religion are not given independent provinces but where all of life is penetrated by and suffused with the Christian faith.

The Christian Community on the College Campus

HUBERT C. NOBLE



AS THE PROTESTANT CHURCHES move to respond to the renewed interest in religion on the part of college leadership and students they are wise to keep in mind some facts that seem obvious to some of us who have a first-hand acquaintance with the field of higher education.

First, they should carefully define what they mean by evangelism in all its historical breadth and depth and not confine it to what John Deschner calls "nineteenth century realities which may or may not be real in the twentieth century". It is not likely that the academic world will accept now a presentation of the gospel that it previously rejected. Evangelism is more than trying to convert people—it is as Deschner goes on to say, "witnessing to the living Lordship of Christ, and it is done by the Holy Spirit as he uses our lives as instruments in making the power of God operative in the lives of others."

Second, they should remember that higher learning was in large part founded and fostered by the Christian Church and that the colleges and universities have a unique function to perform that is based on principles not only approved by Protestantism but in large part mutually shared. However the church conceives of its mission of evangelism it is bound to respect the principles of its own child, the academic community.

If these facts are remembered it seems to me that we are led to a *campus evangelism that forms a Christian community within, adjacent to or overlapping the academic community*. In what follows I shall apply the principle only to the first, the Christian College in which it is possible to form a Christian community within the academic community. Other situations present special problems. Where it is possible the community approach is fundamental for several reasons.

First, the impulse to evangelism may come from within the academic community itself and is thus not resisted as an alien invasion. Second, it is possible to approach and seek the cooperation of the total academic community rather than having to be satisfied with extra-curricular fringe activities. Third, the campus Christian community knows best the campus situation. It can best speak to the "condition" of administration, faculty and students and will know what is proper and appropriate in the light of a particular academic atmosphere. Fourth, and most important, it is through a community that we can best witness to the living Christ in all of His fullness and depth. The mark of great preaching is the ability to make this witness through verbal utterance though much of the power of the spoken word comes from the life behind it. But great preaching is rare. In its place we get a great deal of speaking in which emotion is artificially related to ideas. This is necessary because some evangelists, confined to the narrow plane of verbal utterance, must resort to a method of stirring feeling apart from their ideas which

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are too thin and shallow to stir life at its vital depths. When ideas are inadequate to deal with a man's real concerns in the depth and breadth of his being they must be artificially related to his sentiments in order that they may be accepted through association. This is not to say the Holy Spirit never speaks through such preaching—through it the living Christ may enter the lives of certain people with certain needs. But for most people it fails to go deep because the understanding of Christ's significance fails to reach them where they really live, their fundamental motives and concerns, so the response wanes as emotion fades.

The alternative to this is that Christ be incorporated in group life experience, in a community, so that the word becomes flesh—it is heard, it is felt, it is seen—it is experienced in all its fullness. The witness is made through the community both as a group and as individuals.

II

This community is the church on the campus. It naturally assumes responsibility for the so-called religious activities, worship, the nourishing of communal life, discussion, social service, the arranging of programs, regular and special such as religious emphasis week, retreats, etc.: all done in terms of what is right and proper when considered in relation to the communal life of the campus. All this might be considered evangelism through the activity of the worshipping community. Where possible the community will include faculty and administration. All elements of the college will be represented in the fellowship and bring to it the manifold interests and activities of the total campus where they may be lifted up in terms of the mind of Christ, to be judged and at least influenced if not transformed.

The effectiveness of this evangelism depends on the degree to which the living Christ is truly at the heart of it so that by the power of the Holy Spirit the community nourishes in warmth and depth the spiritual life of its members and gives evidence that Christ is the Lord of its own inner life and interpersonal relations. It depends also on the ability of the community to be inclusive rather than exclusive and reach out and vitally influence campus life through whole-hearted participation in the total college program. It must also show imagination and skill in interpreting the significance of faith to all aspects of college life and meeting the peculiar needs of students and faculty.

Personal witness is not unrelated to the work of the campus christian community. This form of evangelism suffers greatly from the too common idea that is confined to the spoken word. The source of the idea is that element of the church that has reduced faith in Christ to dogma and thinks of evangelism as winning the assent of others to a particular dogma. But Christ is more than dogma and when he enters a life it is the whole life that bears witness, not merely the mind and the tongue. We all know this yet we have allowed the idea to spread in the church that evangelism consists of going out and telling people what we think we believe. The cause of Christ and the church is often harmed by those young

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people who bring this idea to the campus and with obvious sincerity, and sometimes arrogance, violate all the academic proprieties in their attempt to convince others of their particular dogma or form of Christian expression. This aggressiveness is resented in the academic community and creates resistance that closes minds and hardens hearts so that the gospel never gets a chance.

In place of this idea we must see that for most of us our witness is made by the Holy Spirit as we carry out our vocations as Christian students or faculty in the whole of campus life. A Christian student is called of God to be first of all a student and a Christian professor is called of God first of all to fulfill his academic calling. Christ in our hearts may become known to others as they see and feel His spirit in our lives, as they see our quality as students, as they see the type of activity to which we give our support, the spirit we manifest in the classroom, athletics, political office, or fraternity life, and, most of all, as they feel His love in the warmth and concern we show for those around us.

This is not to say that verbal witness is excluded. There is ample opportunity for the student or faculty member to speak the timely word either in public meetings, in discussion groups or in conversation but it must be done in humility and love and with due concern for the properties of time and place. Two or three years ago during a panel discussion at a Student-Faculty retreat I heard a popular and able professor speak out with force and sincerity, a testimony of his Christian faith. What he believed had long been implicit in his personal life and approach to his discipline but here was the time and place to be explicit and many students spoke of what the testimony meant to them. In contrast, I think of a professor at the same retreat who had been asked to speak on the relation of the Christian faith to his field, economics. The result was so embarrassing that even students squirmed. For he testified to a narrow dogmatic faith and then followed it with an attempt to relate the faith to economics in a manner so patently artificial and naive that both the faith and the faculty were discredited.

The degree to which students should be expected to be evangelists of verbal witness is to me definitely limited. Verbal witness must come from conviction—a student is by definition in the process of broadening his horizons of knowledge and should be examining his inherited convictions if he is to find a personal faith that will be his own. Feeling under obligation to testify, some students never dare to examine their convictions. They have been taught that they are Christian soldiers called to fight in defense of a dogma and never dare to lay down their arms or ask themselves if they really believe in what they are fighting for. The result too often is personality problems and non-faith or if faith is retained it is compartmentalized, and Christ's Lordship is confined to a narrow area of life, never becoming the principle of interpretation that gives meaning to all of life.

However, there is a type of witness that a Christian student can make in the midst of all his growth, turmoil, and search for understanding. I think of two recent graduates who were the most effective evangelists, much of it through the

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spoken word. They came to the campus relatively shallow, happy, nominal Christians. The Holy Spirit touched them and they became witnesses, not so much to settled convictions, but to their enthusiasm for the search. They preached the conviction of the importance of having convictions and the extreme importance of seeking the best. This was fresh air evangelism that opened the doors and windows of many minds, that the Holy Spirit might enter. They testified to the God who yet speaketh by witnessing to the living, thinking Christ, our eternal contemporary.

III

Finally, there is the challenge of trying to make our witness to Christ as Lord of all aspects of campus life. For most people Christ only becomes known as they see his spirit expressed in human relations and activity. To this end the Christian community must unceasingly lead out in the effort to make His spirit the norm or standard by which everything on the campus is judged. In the past this effort has been too much confined to personal ethics and morals in extra-curricular activity. We must go much further and deeper in this area and seriously raise questions as to what Christ means in our conduct of athletics, social life, campus politics and living group influence. The latter is of particular concern. For most students the major life-changing influences are their day-to-day companionships with fellow-students in campus life and particularly the impact of the living units—dormitories, fraternities and sororities. How these can be made centers of Christian influence is a major challenge. But it is doubtful if we will take this challenge seriously until we establish the relevance of the living Christ to the disciplines and curriculum of the college. To me this is the heart of the problem of campus evangelism.

Some years ago while speaking on Realistic Evangelism, H. H. Farmer of England, asked this question, "When does the presentation of a truth call forth a response?" One of his answers was that it calls forth a response when the listener sees that it is bound up with matters of importance, when it relates to his values. His values may be the wrong values, but unless he sees a relationship between them and the truth being presented, the truth never comes alive for him.

This is what is happening when Christian truth is presented to the majority of the faculty and students of our colleges and universities. It is not coming alive because it seems irrelevant to the things about which they are concerned. To us it may be the word of salvation; to them it is either an answer they cannot believe or an answer to questions they are not asking. Most of them see the relevance of Christianity's ethical and moral teaching but say, "Why dress up in the panoply of religious practice what decent people believe anyway?" And most faculty members are pretty decent people. This is the secularism which many of us bewail and sometimes attribute to the division of religion and education caused by our doctrine of the separation of the church and state. Such a division may be a partial factor but the deeper reason is that we have failed to reestablish theologically the relationship of the Christian faith to the dominant values of our western culture which

it once held. The arts and sciences broke away from the church because the old theological basis of their relationship was false and denied freedom. The Roman Catholics have revised but never forsaken the Thomistic synthesis but Protestantism has never given major attention to the construction of a theological interpretation that made clear the relation of culture to faith. The result is that in a modern university if theology has any place at all, it is just another subject and anything but "the queen of sciences."

It is unnecessary to recapitulate the well-known historical causes of the separation but I mention three that are particularly relevant. One is the bitter struggle the arts and sciences had to wage to free themselves from what Dr. Robert E. Fitch calls protestant clericalism. As he puts it, "The war for academic freedom was fought on three main fronts. One centered around Darwin and the liberation of the natural sciences from fundamentalist doctrine. Another was focused on historical research and interpretation, and involved the effort of all the social sciences to achieve some sort of objective scientific method. A third front, which extended beyond the borders of the academic world, had to do with literature, music, and the arts, which were in rebellion against a baleful influence called Puritanism."

A second reason is the specialization necessary to become master of any field of knowledge. Between the pressure of heavy teaching loads, busy campus life, and the tremendous growth of knowledge in all fields, the average faculty member has little time for the wider reading necessary to be a lay theologian and relate his specialty to the presuppositions of faith. And he gets little help from the average minister, who, rather than being an intellectual leader through his preaching, must conform to the demand of his congregations that he be a sort of spiritual social worker.

A third reason is, partly due to Protestant theological vacuum and partly due to the nature of science, the various sciences have tended to develop their own philosophical pre-suppositions. The theological vacuum is well described by Dr. Fitch. "For the academic mind Protestantism is not a genuine philosophy; it is not rationally satisfying in a comprehensive sense; it is not a system. . . . Protestant rationalism is individualistic, inquiring, pluralistic, and experimental. It does not generate a system of thought so much as it reflects a spiritual impulse which, through the prophetic personalities of a Luther, a Calvin, a Wesley, a George Fox, or through some courageous and intractable sect, thrusts into history a series of insights and of principles for the religious inspiration and guidance of man . . . for the present this spiritual impulse lacks unitary structure and logical coherence, and the academic mind is baffled by it."

Coupled with this is the fact that the sciences have tended to develop pre-suppositions of faith based on the discoveries of science. In doing this they have entered the field of philosophy and faith. Some scientists recognize this and have adopted logical positivism, a leading if not the leading school of philosophy today.

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The majority have no articulate philosophy but operate from unconscious assumptions.

It is almost inevitable, for example, that psychology, the science dedicated to understanding man, will go beyond its factual discoveries and postulate hypotheses of faith. Applied psychology could not function without them. So, as Outler says, "modern psychotherapy, beyond its science and its art, is also a wisdom about life." He goes on to point out that in a man as profound as Fromm this is conscious and explicit—his faith is religious humanism. For most psychologists the faith is an implicit and unexamined naturalism.

This is true to a greater or lesser degree in most fields of learning. But before bemoaning our godless universities and naturalist professors we need to ask, "What alternative have they?". Where is the theological understanding that will enable them to harmonize with intellectual integrity that which they believe to be true in their field of study, with what they may believe to be true in the Christian faith?

Of course we all know plenty of Christians in the universities but it is my observation that most of them simply accept this dichotomy and by compartmentalization are enabled to be honest scientists and at least nominal Christians. It is interesting to note that the natural scientists seem to find this much easier than the social scientists.

But the fact is, unable to relate his field of study in a meaningful way to the Christian faith, a faculty member can be little more than a nominal Christian. This becomes clear when we see Christian faculty being used to help students think through their religious problems. "Two years ago, in preparation for Religious Emphasis Week, one college asked its professors and departments to give some thought as to how they could raise within each department the question, 'what is the significance for the Christian faith for this department?' Nearly everyone was cooperative but when it came down to action the universal question was 'what do we do?'. I can't see any particular relation other than the ethical implications."

This came out even more clearly as faculty members were used on discussion panels. Questions of faith were answered with Christian witness. Questions in particular fields were answered from a different set of presuppositions. When it came to relating the two it was done superficially or not at all. A psychologist could see values in Christianity as an aid to personal adjustment or in providing dynamic for ethical living. A political scientist or economist would value Christian ethics but discuss politics or economics from a purely secular point of view. In nearly every instance Christianity had a compartmentalized or marginal place. It was not the vital center. And this is what the students caught from it—a nominal, respectable Christian faith which most of them had already. "Christianity is a good thing—it has certain very real values but of course you can't swallow all of it or take it too seriously." The result of this is that you can say of American students what Dr. Adiseshiah said of most Indian students, "The average student comes out of universities as an evolutionist in natural science, a materialist in history, a de-

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terminist in economics, an idealist in politics and a Christian (Hindu or Moslem) in religion." One can hardly call this the living Christ becoming Lord of Life.

However, before deploring it in the college, we had better face the fact that this is precisely what students would get from the average layman in our churches. I know this from having been a pastor in a church and from talking with many church-going parents of our students. One or two just recently have expressed great concern that their children were considering entering the ministry or the mission field instead of business.

IV

If this analysis has any truth then certainly the answer is not bitter denunciation of the men of good will who teach in our colleges, nor is it more heated exhortations of faith. The answer involves light, theological light, understanding that enables men to love God with their minds as well as their hearts. Not that reason alone will necessarily lead men to Christ but that honest men whose lives are dedicated to the things of the mind cannot wholeheartedly accept Christ if it involves closing the mind.

Whatever else it involves the answer certainly depends on the ability of the church to make advances in developing more adequate theological insights. We don't have to wait for a genius to produce a great *Summa*, but we do have to raise up theologians who are also experts in various disciplines and thus capable of relating a sound theology to the various fields of knowledge. Fortunately progress in this direction is already being made.

In psychology, for example, men like David Roberts, Rollo May and Albert Outler are clarifying the issues in the field and showing where Christian presuppositions lead in contrast to those of naturalism. In the field of economics most encouraging developments are taking place. Under the leadership of Cameron Hall and Dudley Ward for the National Council of Churches, an extensive research and interpretation project is about completed. The first three volumes of six projected have been printed and show how the insights of specialists in various fields such as psychology, economics, political science, philosophy, and theology can be brought together for the enrichment of Christian understanding.

A great contribution of the ecumenical movement is the vitality of the theological thinking it is stimulating, a good example of which is the Amsterdam Conference Book. Independent organizations such as the Hazen Foundation are working in this area and making books and pamphlets available that discuss the relation of the Christian faith to various disciplines. In other words, material is now being produced that makes ignorance less excusable. There is help available for faculty members to think deeply and profoundly in the area of faith. The Commission on Christian Higher Education of the National Council is making extensive plans to get this material in the hands of professors and to stimulate the forming of groups for thought and discussion. We can all aid in the effort by spreading this information among college faculties.

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We can perhaps do more by concentrating the attention of the church toward developing a strategy of evangelism that truly fits the academic world. Some elements of such a strategy may be suggested. First: The church must give serious attention to the academic world as a unique field of evangelism in this broader sense. It must project a long-range program of work with and in colleges for which it uses its best minds and leadership. Such a program may involve a change of the attitude that college Christian activities should aim at keeping the student related to his local church. It should try to keep him in the fellowship of a Christian community. But it is probable that a campus Christian community centered around the Lordship of Christ in that community will best help a student grow in faith during his college career. If such a community is impossible on the campus then perhaps the student should be encouraged to enter the fellowship of a church adjacent to the campus where his peculiar needs and problems are given major attention. Second: these communities must be made centers of ideas and thought rather than activity programs. Students must be given an opportunity to grow in their understanding of faith as their minds expand in other areas. College work leaders must be selected for their theological competence and capacity to lead students intellectually and meet faculties on an equal level of academic competence. Third: thought should be given to the organizing of college preparatory courses for high school students. If a college prep course is necessary academically it is equally necessary theologically. Such a course should prepare a student for college by giving him understanding of the place higher education has had in the history of the church, by leading him to expect upset and confusion in his thinking as part of normal Christian growth, by stimulating him to search for himself the sound faith and convictions he must have.

Through such a program, we may prepare the way for the Holy Spirit to make the living Christ come alive in the academic world, and stop the drift that is causing the church, as Dr. Paul Payne puts it, to lose its head.

Concerning a Theology of Education

HOWARD B. JEFFERSON



WHEN FIRST I RECEIVED AN INVITATION to be one of the speakers on the topic "Toward a Theology of Education" I was frankly puzzled. Many of us have long been concerned with the place of theological studies in university organization and with the place of religion in undergraduate liberal education. But considerations of this sort are quite different from the type of thinking suggested by the phrase "Theology of Education."

My approach to this topic is not from the perspective of the theologian, but from the point of view of an educational administrator who, among other things, is constantly faced with the task of weighing competing claims and of trying to bring into some sort of harmony the diverse and apparently contradictory points of view to be found in the academic community.

When the theologian presents his claim to be heard, he can be very persuasive. He hits where it hurts, because he attacks those weaknesses of which every administrator is aware. For example, he asks if we are happy about the indifference to values which has characterized so much of recent education. Obviously we are not, because many of us have used thousands of words to sound the alarm on this front. One of our fraternity has declared that "All of us by now are a bit frightened by the nihilism that characterized so much of the intellectual landscape before the War."¹ Frightened, yes. But what have we done about it? Our tentative programs of indoctrinating students with the basic ideals of democracy are not the complete answer. Theology, we are told, offers the solution because ultimately we must encounter the living God who is the Source of all Value.

Again, the theologian makes a strong point in pressing us on the one assumption that we all take for granted, namely, that education has the two-fold task of transmitting accumulated knowledge and of constantly searching for new truth. He opens up his criticism here with a commendable modesty and even apology. He admits that some educational crimes have been committed in the name of theology. From time to time religious groups have made their own traditions or their own conceptual formulations of God's revelation the object of their supreme devotion, and thus have been guilty of idolatry. Having disarmed us with this candid admission our theologian goes on to question us about our pretended concern for truth. Are we, he asks, really interested in truth or are we content merely with a series of little and unconnected truths? If the former, then once again we are confronted with the relevance of theology. One of our Fellows (H. P. Van Dusen) asks: "But if truth is an organic whole, how does it come to be so? Whence springs its interrelatedness and coherence? What do these imply regarding the nature of Reality? We are driven hard up against the question of God. By the same token,

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religion, a true knowledge of God, far from being a peripheral or incidental subject in the scheme of education—one stone located here or there haphazard in the educational arch—is the Queen of the Sciences, not because the Church says so, or because superstition or tradition have so imposed it upon human credulity, or because it was so recognized in one great age of learning, but because of the nature of Reality—because if there be a God at all, He must be the ultimate and controlling Reality through which all else derives its being, and the truth concerning Him, as best man can apprehend it, must be the keystone of the ever-incomplete arch of human knowledge.”²

Even more persuasive than these considerations is a third attack on contemporary educational practice. We are told that our pretensions to lack of bias, to neutrality, are a sham. Even if it were possible to be purely objective, to take a spectator view of all issues with a meticulous description and analysis of the alternatives, it would be an act of irresponsibility to do so. We can ill afford an attitude of this sort at a time when the survival of civilization is at stake. Unless the university takes a stand on the great issues and is unambiguously committed to life-giving values, its influence will shrink to insignificance. Members of the present student generation, living in “an habitual consciousness of a world which seems about to fall in on them,”³ are painfully aware that their choices and decisions will have fateful consequences. They feel that a university which attempts to maintain a neutrality is hopelessly remote from their problems and concerns. They may continue to find the university a valuable place for professional training but will look elsewhere for help on the great issues of life.

We are reminded also that in many instances an apparent neutrality is really an undercover method of taking sides. Religion itself is a case in point. Positive religious commitment and positive hostility toward religion are not the only possibilities. Neutrality itself implies an indifference, that religion is, in fact, unimportant. As one observer has put it, “The American university does not in reality care a button about religion. It looks upon religion as one of the minor amusements, like china painting or playing the flute, pleasant for those who enjoy that sort of thing, but not an intellectual or practical necessity.”⁴ On the matter of religion, we are told, we cannot be neutral. If an educational system does not have an explicit philosophy it will at least have an implicit one. In the words of William Temple, “We have supposed that it is possible to provide education which is religiously neutral, to which religion can then be added in greater or less measure. But, in fact, an education which is not religious is atheistic; there is no middle way. If you give to children an account of the world from which God is left out, you are teaching them to understand the world without reference to God. If He is then introduced, He is an excrescence. He becomes an appendix to His own creation.”⁵

Finally, the pretense of neutrality is a sham because it is riddled with self-deception. In every field of inquiry there are basic assumptions and principles of interpretation. There are also principles implicit in the organization of studies.

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Whether we admit it or not, these do constitute a kind of world-view which pervades the modern university. And, the theologian informs us, the assumptions which make up this philosophy are false. For example, we have an unjustified faith in the power and the unconditioned quality of reason itself. We also have an incorrect view of man's nature and therefore of his predicament. Thus, if our attempt at neutrality is really nothing more than a case of self-deception, if we do, in fact, have a world-view which, when made explicit, is shown to be false, should we not frankly adopt a theology as the organizing principle of education?

I trust that I have given a reasonably fair summary of the theologian's case. It is a strong case and raises problems that must be taken seriously. Yet I am forced to conclude that the university as a corporate entity must remain essentially neutral. Although from one point of view the university is an organized whole, from another point of view it is a collection of individual scholars who teach and discover. In this latter sense it is an anomaly to think of the university *per se* taking a stand or supporting one side in a controversy. It is, rather, an environment in which each person is encouraged to arrive at his own conclusion. While this appears to be a flat rejection of the theological argument, I find that it does have something in common with pronouncements of many theologians. It is no news to this group that there has been what Daniel Williams calls a "theological renaissance"⁶ in recent years (although the news may have been received with mixed feelings). This renaissance is characterized by a rejection of optimistic liberalism and by the positive attempt to rediscover the meaning of the unique Christian revelation. To those outside the movement, this turn of religious thinking may appear to be a dangerous revival of obscurantism and even of intellectual authoritarianism. Yet the incurable liberal who reads carefully the modern statements on revelation is somewhat reassured. He learns that, according to the new understanding of the meaning of revelation, "Christian thought can be set free from the intolerable dogmatism which results from claiming that God's truth is identical with some human formulation of it. It gives freedom for critical re-examination of every Christian statement in the light of further experience."⁷ And thus, although the modern theologian is critical of the university for attempting the impossible task of remaining neutral, he is also critical of any commitment other than that to the living God who transcends all human institutions, persons, and intellectual formulations. There is, in part at least, the insistence upon the kind of open academic community which is meant by the statement that the university as such must be neutral.

Frequently there appears to be confusion in the criticism of universities for being neutral. It certainly does not follow that because an institution does not take a corporate stand on issues the individual faculty members must forever remain in a mood of suspended judgment. As a matter of fact, one of the reasons that an institution consciously follows a philosophy of pluralism is that in this way room may be made for a variety of convictions. It should be obvious that the mind of the

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individual instructor cannot or should not be pluralistic. The teacher and scholar, although a seeker of truth, will have a point of view giving coherence to his ideas and a sense of direction for his inquiries. There is an appropriate manner in which he holds his convictions in relation with his students and colleagues. He should in all candor share his convictions with his students and present the considerations on which his judgment is based. While he need not be lukewarm regarding his beliefs, he must be open to new insights and must not hold to his position with a cynical disdain of other points of view. He must forever make the honest and sincere effort to understand rival views before he attempts to criticize them. While the distinction between the mind of the individual teacher and the mind of the university would appear to be elementary, it is nevertheless true that some religious critics of the university have failed to make that distinction. The academic attitude of detachment with serious inhibitions against taking a stand of any sort may be a part of the atmosphere of a university but is not a necessary consequence of the official neutrality of the institution.

A few moments ago I said that from one point of view the university is an organized whole and that from another point of view it is a collection of individual teachers and scholars. It is in the latter sense that the university must be pluralistic. However it is not completely irresponsible. Let us consider two areas in which there must be collective responsibility and in our discussion we shall look for what help may be expected from a theological perspective.

For one thing, although the university as such does not take a stand on basic philosophies, the results of scholarship, or issues of public policy, it does assume responsibility for the quality of work and thought which culminate in conclusions. It rightly insists on the intellectual virtues of precision, integrity, and thoroughness. It guarantees that the best possible methods have been employed. But it must not be dogmatic with regard to what is the right method. It is here, I believe, that the theologian has a legitimate ground of criticism.

A few years ago, when making a study of the teaching of religion, I was frequently confronted with a point of view which may be summarized as follows: Religion in the university tends to confuse things and to undermine whatever hope there is of achieving a unity of spirit within the community of teachers and students. Theological method depends ultimately upon revelation, even though revelation is defined in a variety of ways. This is confusing and disruptive because in all other fields there is free rational inquiry and uninhibited criticism. There can be a wide agreement on the proper and reliable method, a method which would rule out revelation. In the second place, religion inevitably introduces considerations of the supernatural world and therefore raises questions with which reason and experience cannot deal.

It may be enlightening to compare this attitude with another one concerning method which was current some centuries ago. You may remember the amusing incident which Max Otto records in his *The Human Enterprise*. "Some time ago,"

he writes, "my attention was called to an extract from a *Chronicle of an Ancient Monastery*, dated 1432. It reported a lively dispute that lasted many days and that stirred up considerable feeling. The quarrel was over the number of teeth in the mouth of a horse. Learned books were brought out, ancient documents were consulted, erudition was shown the like of which had never been seen in that monastery or in the region round about, but the problem was not solved.

"When the disputation had gone on for thirteen days with no end in sight, 'a youthful friar of goodly bearing' asked his elders for permission to say a word. The permission being granted, he made a suggestion which only gave the brethren a fresh cause for anger.

" 'To the wonderment of the disputants,' reads the *Chronicle*, 'whose profound wisdom he sore vexed, he beseeched them to unbend in a manner unheard of, and to look into the open mouth of a horse for an answer to their questions. At this, their dignity being grievously hurt, they waxed exceeding wroth; and joining in a mighty uproar, they flew upon him and smote him hip and thigh, and cast him out forthwith.' They excused their rough treatment of the young friar, excused it to themselves and to posterity, by adding: 'Surely Satan hath tempted this bold neophyte to declare unholy and unheard-of ways of finding truth contrary to all the teachings of the fathers.'

"Having rid themselves of the traitor in their midst, or as we might say, the radical in their midst, they resumed their argument about the number of the horse's teeth. Finally they gave up the problem altogether, and the account ends with these words: 'After many more days of painful strife, the dove of peace sat on the assembly, and they, as one man, declared the problem to be an everlasting mystery, owing to the dearth of historical and theological evidence thereof, and so ordered it writ down.' "

This is amusing because it illustrates the way in which a method gone wrong may become ridiculous. The learned fraternity must be constantly alert to the dangers of freezing a method, no matter how fruitful it has been. A decline in scholarship sets in when the persistent questions are put aside because they cannot be dealt with according to the orthodox method. The periods of greatest vitality in educational history have been those in which ways were in the process of being devised to deal with important issues and to advance learning. Decline has accompanied those periods when a method became so hardened that it was unable to adjust to new interests and problems. In illustration of this Robert Ulrich has written: "The stupendous rise of Scholasticism from the primitive forms of contrast in Abelard's *Sic et Non* to the highly developed dialectic in Thomas Aquinas' *Summa Theologiae*, resulted from the introduction of Aristotelian logic; the decay came when the imitators of Aristotle refused to modify their deductive form of thinking in favor of a combination of inductive and deductive methods of research.

"But we should not always quote the Scholastic universities as an example of failure of adjustment of the mind to new and more creative methods: the Protestant

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Universities of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were just as defective or even worse. In their initial period they rejected even the works of Aristotle in favor of a more inspirational form of thinking, with the result that already some years after the beginning of the Reformation Melancthon repentingly admonished his academic colleagues at Wittenberg to readmit the Greek philosopher to the intellectual Pantheon.

"But even so, the one-sided emphasis on the philological interpretation of the Bible, or The Word, resulted in a continuation of Scholasticism in a Protestant framework and made seventeenth and eighteenth century Protestant theology one of the most barren events in Western thought, incapable of holding its stand against pietist and romantic individualism on the one hand, and rationalist intellectualism on the other."⁹

In our day, the theologian in his capacity as critic can render a genuine service by raising questions concerning the currently orthodox methods. He can help also by insisting that the profound human problems, even though they cannot be solved by the precise methods of science, must nevertheless receive our careful attention. He is not the only one who can do this, but he can be particularly helpful because of his special interests.

In the second place, it is the collective responsibility of the university to consider repeatedly and with utmost seriousness the conditions of and the reasons for the principle of pluralism, the principle which encourages diversity of points of view. One familiar argument is that the absence of conformity is a necessary condition for the discovery of truth. The true function of the university is destroyed whenever a group of scholars is under the dictation of ecclesiastical or political authority, or silenced by loud criticism of powerful groups in the community. There must be absence of restraint not only for the health of the university but for the welfare of the public it serves. One outstanding reason for this policy is to be discovered in its consequences for the social welfare. So far as this argument goes it meets with general approval, at least by members of the academic community.

There is another consideration which is not so simple and which raises some perplexing problems. It goes something like this: Since certain types of belief are not susceptible to rational demonstration and verification, we must allow for an open traffic in these beliefs. No one has the right to impose on others an idea whose truth cannot be proved.

Among the beliefs belonging to this category are those having to do with religion and morals. The question is, of course, "How open may the traffic in these beliefs be? Are there any limitations? What is the collective responsibility of the university in this matter?"

When John Locke formulated the principle for religion in an open society he proceeded with an attitude and under the guidance of two principles which placed some limits on tolerance. He adopted a positive and friendly attitude toward religion. He was interested in the service of God and was trying to work out a re-

conciliation of religions to that end. He also believed that the essentials of religious truth could be demonstrated. It was only the non-essential over beliefs which must be taken on faith. Finally, the traffic in religious beliefs was closed to atheists. The Lockean principles are not particularly helpful in our day. To be sure, the adoption of a friendly attitude toward religion is a live possibility, but the two principles which guided Locke would not now receive general approval. Whether religious beliefs are capable of being proved true is an open question. Although some philosophers would give an affirmative answer to the question, the fact remains that there are members of the academic community, assumed to be reasonable, who have not been persuaded that this is the case. It seems then the traffic must be open to negative as well as to positive religious ideas.

What can we find to bring order into this situation? One popular suggestion is reminiscent of the plan adopted by the Roman Empire. There all manner of religions were admitted so long as the separate groups of worshippers were united in their allegiance to the Imperial Religion. So, it is proposed, in the modern university, the control of religious chaos may be brought about by insisting that everyone worship at the shrine of scientific method and the processes of democracy. It is obvious that in the learned republic a faith should be as reasonable as possible, and that all conceptualizations are open to revision. But if the method of science and democracy is introduced as a new religion, it too must be subject to criticism.

As regards moral convictions, there is something less than complete openness. If one were to examine all the catalogues of all the colleges and universities in the United States, one might get the impression that there is nothing under the sun which fails to find its way into some curriculum. Although I have never completed this thankless task I doubt very much if there are courses which instruct young people in the art of making a living by cracking safes or picking pockets. Polanyi argues that according to the doctrine of intellectual freedom, as it has come down to us, "a system of mendacity, lawlessness, and cruelty is to be accepted on equal terms as an alternative to ethical principles."¹⁰ We do not follow this logic, but we need to go beyond the mere appeal to conventional morality to explain why we don't. In the statement of the Association of American Universities on "The Rights and Responsibilities of Universities and their Faculties" the university is defined as an association of individual scholars, and the statement affirms that these scholars "are united in loyalty to the ideal of learning, to the moral code, to the country, and to its form of government." But in being loyal to the moral code the responsibility of scholars does not stop with being law-abiding citizens. They must be collectively concerned with the nature of the moral code and with the meaning of loyalty to it. Unthinking reliance on convention is not sufficient for these days. I would subscribe to Moberly's remark that "In nothing has Dr. Flexner's book more clearly 'dated' than in his suggestion that morality, like cleanliness, can now be taken for granted. This is the fundamental question of our day. How are the universities oriented towards it?"¹¹

Having said earlier that from one point of view the university must remain neutral, I am now suggesting that there should be more careful thinking about the meaning and justification of that neutrality. Since I am attempting to discuss these matters from the point of view of one who presides over faculty discussions rather than from the perspective of a theologian, I shall not attempt to give the answers to the questions which I have raised. Assuming, however, that groups of scholars were to take these problems seriously, I can venture to hope what might be the outcome, not so much in terms of doctrinal statements as in shared attitudes. And it is just possible that these attitudes might have theological overtones.

What are some of these attitudes? The basic one is humility which stems from the recognition of the limitation and fallibility of human reason. A good start would be made if such an outlook were generally shared and would replace whatever is left of dogmatic claims, complacent philosophic doubt, and arrogant skepticism. Surely there is no dearth of resources in our world today to induce a modesty about the possibilities of human reason. Living in a time of anxiety when great events appear to occur uncontrolled and unplanned by rational processes, when we are warned on every side about rationalizations, and the self-deception frequently involved in attempts to think logically and objectively, when philosophers are spending great effort in the task of defining the narrow limits of scientific reason, it is not especially difficult to become humble. But the attitude I hope will emerge is not one which ends up in futility or mere negation. It is rather one part of a cluster of attitudes.

Among the additional members of this cluster I should like to mention five.

1. The admitted limitations and imperfections in human thinking do not preclude the possibility of a structure of truth and goodness which lays claim on our allegiance. On the contrary, the very meaning and implications of our situation points to such a structure. We are humble, doubtful or skeptical precisely because we are aware that neither our ideas nor our actions fully express the reality or the perfection toward which we aim. The meaning of the contrary point of view is not confined to speculative thought; it has found tragic expression in historic fact. We have witnessed the practical consequences of a nihilistic outlook—where incompleteness and relativity in moral perceptions were made the basis of the denial of a meaningful good, and where failure to find the ultimate truth has been used as an excuse for proclaiming a dogmatic irrationalism. If these destructive consequences have not found complete expression in our own culture the reason may be that there is still sufficient vitality in our religious tradition to prevent it. As one reads J. S. Mill today one can hardly avoid the conclusion that he assumed the presence and regulative strength of inherited Christian ideals. But in making these of relative unimportance in his theoretical formulations, he pretended to rest his argument exclusively on principles which, in fact, were only a part of the total situation as he felt it. Polanyi believes that the actual survival of a religious outlook, even though rejected by philosophy, provided decisive protective restraints in the Anglo-

American tradition. But these restraints "were absent in those parts of Europe where liberalism was based on French Enlightenment. This movement being anti-religious, it imposed no restraint on skeptical speculations; nor were the standards of morality embodied here in democratic institutions. When a feudal society, dominated by religious authority, was attacked by a radical skepticism, there emerged a liberalism which was unprotected either by a religious or a civic tradition against destruction by the philosophic skepticism to which it owed its origin."¹² It is not to be expected that groups of teachers would agree on this or any other particular historical interpretation. Such a phenomenon would be undesirable. But it may not be too much to hope that serious attention to the problems here considered would bring to life the vision of an underlying order, even though concerning it we may be frequently mistaken, and of which at best we can have only fleeting and partial knowledge.

2. Serious thought about the conditions of the essential neutrality of a university will lead to the asking of questions about the nature of the world in which the scholar's task is carried on. What is the nature of a world in which it is possible to have a pluralistic approach to truth and yet in which it is possible for each to communicate something of his findings to others? Is the character of reality such that men freely act and inquire? Are such practical and intellectual activities fraught with significance, and do they lend meaning and dignity to human existence? What is the source of the creative energy that finds expression in the scholarly vocation and what is its goal? While it is doubtful that a definitive metaphysics would emerge from consideration of questions of this sort, there might be a clarification of assumptions. We might come to some understanding of why we consider our undertakings worth while. We might recognize the obligations inherent in our undertakings and yet realize that being bound by the obligations does not make impossible the continuous interaction between our selves and the world we are trying to understand. Even a dim recognition of the fact that we work in a common world would lead us to see that the philosophy of pluralism for a university does not mean merely that each of us is left free to go his own way. It is, beyond this, a condition for the life of the spirit where the individual insights are shared, and where communication brings about the enrichment of all. The fact that the answer is not easily forthcoming does not absolve us from facing the question as to what kind of world it is in which the assumptions underlying our work as teachers and scholars are justified.

3. The open academic community means that no ideas, beliefs, or institutions are exempt from criticism. Nor are any of the criticisms themselves exempt from further scrutiny. But the conditions of criticism must be understood. The individual person tends to make an unjustifiable distinction between his rational function and other parts of his being. Although he knows that he is conditioned by his ancestral background, his native endowments, the things that have happened to him, his particular congeries of experiences, he is always tempted to imagine

that he can transcend all these limiting factors when he engages in rational criticism. There is, of course, some excuse for this because self transcendence is, to some extent, a definite possibility. But that this possibility is not limitless is recognized by the college or university president. When a young scholar is being considered as a candidate for a teaching position, and when the appointing officer wants to know the candidate's point of view, he looks into the background of graduate school and the identity of the chief graduate professor. This proves to be a fairly reliable guide to information about the young person's perspective.

In the educational process there is the endless attempt to understand all individual items from a perspective which transcends them all. Yet the wise man is cautious lest he make unjustifiable claims for his own universal judgment. The theologian believes that there is a proper perspective but that it is out of the reach of human achievement. Only if the spirit of man is inspired by God can he reach a plane where he can understand the true meaning of criticism. Even here there is the difficult job of disentangling the Divine element from human distortion. But whether we state this situation in theological terms or not, there is the constant task of guarding against two errors. On the one hand, an individual or a group may make its standpoint of criticism absolute. This is the difficulty with sectarian education. It brings meaning into the educational process but it is a false meaning because imposed by a partial perspective. On the other hand, recognition of the partiality and relativity of all standpoints may terminate in nothing more than that recognition. The vision of the possibility of a unified perspective is lost and criticism is reduced to the endless round of each person looking at various points of view from his own admittedly partial standpoint. Here it is next to impossible to bring meaning into education.

4. The liberty implicit in the philosophy of pluralism is not absolute. This fact is recognized by nearly all the attempts to justify academic freedom against recent attacks. We are reminded, for example, that this freedom is "qualified by legal duty or obligation," it "must be judged by its consequences on a whole cluster of other freedoms (values)," it must not be used to destroy the principles of the society in which it functions. But the university must accept the collective responsibility of thinking and re-thinking about the nature of the limitation on liberty and about the uses to which the liberty should be put. Perhaps the key to this may be found in recognizing that the teacher has commitments. But it is terribly important that he should not be committed to the wrong masters. Thus in attempting to keep alive the creative elements in his culture he may become the instrument of chauvinism. In trying to avoid a mere empty freedom he may become the servant of some scheme of education which has been hardened into a false absolute. In the light of our discussion, it seems that his freedom takes place within the framework of a structure of truth and goodness, an understanding of the assumptions which underly the scholar's vocation, and under the judgment of a perspective which can justly criticize all beliefs, actions, and institutions. Further thought on the notion that

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academic freedom is justified by its fruits suggests that the teacher is committed also in the sense that his work finds fulfillment as it is of benefit not only to the entire academic community, but also to the larger community in which the university functions. This is the kind of attitude which would greatly assist in the process of transforming the university from a mere collection of individual teachers and scholars into a genuine community of mind and spirit.

5. The university has the collective responsibility for bringing some kind of order into the organization of studies. It is here that our faculties have been most perceptive in recent years. They have recognized a need and have tried to do something about it. They have seen that although it is desirable to have an open society allowing for the free expression of a vast variety of human interests, it is also necessary to sense some unity underlying the diversity. They have recognized the shortcomings as well as the values in an educational process which attempts to meet every student and faculty interest which manifests itself, but which is lacking in a principle under which these interests can be related and harmonized. Whether we consider society or education, we see that we are discussing something more than a mere collection of ideas and criticisms about this and that. There is also the search for a general or universal understanding of the reality within which we live. Where this kind of search is neglected or discouraged we lose the sense of unity of which our individual interests are a part and we have no way of differentiating between things of primary and secondary importance. Admirable as has been the efforts of various faculties to deal with this problem, and to bring unity into the educational process, the results have not been wholly satisfactory. The work has been limited to the relating of one subject matter to another and has not taken seriously enough the problem of understanding each subject matter as a part of a reality in which genuine unity may be found. In the search for something which can genuinely serve as a principle of unity, we can not rest content until we have found that which is really inclusive and worthy of our complete loyalty. Toward the object of this kind of quest, the attitude of reverence is highly appropriate.

In these remarks I have attempted to maintain the point of view of one whose job is to provide the favorable conditions for the work of scholars, rather than from the point of view of one of those scholars. In this capacity I have listened with deep respect to the theologian's criticism of modern education. Yet I have insisted that the university must remain neutral with respect to the results of scholarship. I then proceeded to discuss two areas in which the university as such must accept responsibility. One of these is the methods which are used in arriving at facts or judgments; the other is the consideration of those factors involved in an educational philosophy of pluralism. In my remarks, particularly with respect to the second of these, I described a number of attitudes in such a way that there may have been theological overtones. And yet the vocabulary used is markedly lacking in such terms as Creation, the Fall, the Revelation of God in Christ, Redemption, Resurrection, the Divine-Human Encounter. Within the framework

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of my approach to the subject, this is as near as I can come, at the present time, to a theology of education. Nevertheless, I have been, and shall continue to be, enriched by the sharper criticisms of education from those with clear-cut theological convictions.

NOTES

- ¹ Harry D. Gideonse, "The Coming Showdown in the Schools", *The Saturday Review of Literature*, Vol. 28, Feb. 3, 1945.
- ² *Christian Education*, Vol. XXXI, No. 2, (June, 1948), pp. 90-91.
- ³ Sir Walter Moberly, *The Crisis in the University* (London: SCM Press, 1949), p. 54.
- ⁴ Bernard Iddings Bell, *Crisis in Education* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1949), pp. 152-153.
- ⁵ *The Hope of a New World* (London: 1940), p. 12. (Quoted by Arnold Nash in *The University and the Modern World* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1953, p. 278).
- ⁶ *What Present-day Theologians are Thinking* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1952)
- ⁷ *Ibid.*
- ⁸ Max Otto, *The Human Enterprise* (New York: F. S. Crofts & Co., 1940), pp. 96-97.
- ⁹ "On the Rise, and Decline of Higher Education", in *Goals for American Education*, edited by Lyman Bryson, Louis Finkelstein, and R. M. MacIver, (New York: Harper & Bros., 1950) pp. 3-4.
- ¹⁰ Michael Polanyi, "The Logic of Liberty", in *Measure*, Vol. 1, No. 4, p. 352.
- ¹¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 57.
- ¹² *Op. Cit.*, p. 353.

A Comment on the Preceding Paper

RICHARD W. DAY



HE CONCEPT OF THEOLOGY of education takes on a slightly different meaning when it is considered from the point of view of an administrator rather than from the point of view of the individual teacher. Obviously the administrator must remain neutral in one sense: he must not use his authority or the weight of his position to "settle" issues which can only be settled by free discussion. But there is more than one meaning of being neutral.

It seems to me that in the paper the difference between a policy of neutrality and a policy of pluralism is not made sufficiently clear. At places, the two seem to be taken to mean much the same thing. No doubt in maintaining a balance of competing claims to be heard, the administrator must pursue a policy of pluralism. But need he always be neutral? For example, suppose an agnostic (or atheistic) teacher of social science were gaining a large following on the campus, might not a Christian administrator feel that he should bring in a Christian theologian (who is also competent in social science) not merely to counterbalance the agnostic voice but also because he feels that the Christian voice should be heard? The action would be an expression of the policy of pluralism but not of neutrality. The administrator would be giving expression to his own conviction as to what is the aim of education as well as expressing the policy of pluralism.

What if the situation were reversed and it were the Christian voice which had

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to be counterbalanced? Would the administrator bring in an agnostic for any other reason than that of maintaining a balance of voices? The action would express the policy of pluralism but would not necessarily represent neutrality. The administrator might in fact feel that he had a duty to bring in the agnostic voice because only in terms of free competition can the full dimensions and profundity of the Christian truth be brought out. Thus might a policy of pluralism and genuine *un-neutral* conviction be brought together and expressed in a single act.

The author of the paper, to be sure, makes it clear that neutrality is not indifference. When he speaks of humility before the "reality" of "perfection" which we seek, he is obviously committed prior to the completion of inquiry to "that which is really inclusive and worth our complete loyalty." Such commitment in advance is not neutrality although it may find a policy of pluralism a most useful instrument in the cooperative search for "truth" which a university represents. But the "truth" which the author has in mind is what an Augustinian would call the truth in "general revelation". This is not the "truth" (*aletheia*) of the New Testament. But neither is it the "truth" delivered by scientific method.

Finally, it seems to me that Howard Jefferson has shown very clearly how important and how valuable a theological criticism of campus idols can be—the campus idols being scientific method and the processes of democracy. The proponents of scientific method will no doubt reply that the method is the only one that is truly self-critical and that the virtue of the processes of democracy is that they are based on the scientific method which is self-corrective. To refute this claim would require a much larger space than is proper for such a "comment" as this; but the author-administrator himself has indicated that this can be done only from a point of view which accepts what Tillich calls "the Protestant principle"—a principle of criticism based on the Biblical revelation of God as judge.

A Comment on the Preceding Paper

WALTER HARRELSON



SHALL RESTRICT MY comments upon this very helpful paper to a single point which is, in my judgment, of very considerable importance. The author maintains that "the university as a corporate entity must remain essentially neutral". In the same paragraph he points out that there is a kind of support for his contention in recent theological discussion which distinguishes between God's truth and human formulations of God's truth, and which "gives freedom for critical re-examination of every Christian statement in the light of further experience."

I fail entirely to see how any support for an attitude of neutrality toward religion on the part of the university can be drawn from the insistence upon what

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Paul Tillich has called the "Protestant principle". Theologians who insist upon the distinction between God's truth and any human formulation of it, who point out that the Christian has freedom for critical analysis of every Christian statement in the light of further experience, are by no means pleading for neutrality. On the contrary, it is the commitment of faith which itself demands this openness toward all truth. Only because the reality of God is taken seriously is it imperative that one distinguish between God's truth and its human formulations. What is demanded is not neutrality but allegiance to God and to God alone. The university as a corporate entity cannot perhaps be said to be either faithful or apostate. But how can it be neutral? Its very existence is indicative of the commitment of its founders and supporters to some significant end. If this end is defined in the most general terms possible, such as the free inquiry into all aspects of reality, then it is the conviction of founders and supporters that inquiry into the nature of things is a good for mankind. But this is not a self-evident truth. It is a commitment of faith.

It is equally clear that no university can remain neutral regarding the passion and the seriousness with which its assumed ends, whatever they are, are pursued. The university *as a corporate entity* has a stake in the enterprise upon which its scholars and teachers are embarked. Here I would suggest that there may be a confusion in the paper between neutrality and pluralism. I am very much in favor of the pluralistic approach, for what are to me compelling theological reasons. Here the distinction between God's truth and man's formulations of it is quite pertinent. The university, as a community of scholars and teachers, will always be pluralistic, quite apart from whether the heads of the institution desire this or not. Such pluralism should be insisted upon, so that there may be a serious presentation of all significant views of the nature of God, man and society. But this is an entirely different thing from neutrality. The university may, and in my judgment should, insist upon the investigation and presentation of religious phenomena by atheists and by believers of different persuasions. But it will do so, not because it is neutral, but because it is not. If it is a "secular" institution, then it will be pluralistic because it dares not ignore those areas of inquiry in which serious and competent men of faith have found, or believe that they have found, data of importance for life. If it is a "religious" institution, then precisely because it is religious, it will insist upon the presentation of data gathered by serious and honest scholars who claim no religious commitment. The university should be pluralistic, but it dare not pretend to be neutral. It is a responsible institution, and all responsibility demands commitment.

Books and Publications

SOME PUBLICATIONS ON THE CHRISTIAN COLLEGE

BOOKS AND OTHER publications devoted solely to aspects of the Christian colleges' nature and purposes are relatively few. Some of the denominational boards of higher education have such materials available and these should be requested directly from their offices. An example of this material is to be found in a recent booklet entitled, "Religion in the Church College," which was prepared under the direction of the Committee on Campus Religious Life of the Board of Education of the Methodist Church. Other small publications which have an inter-denominational character would include "The Church College," the report of the seminar held in Toronto, Canada, in 1950, which was prepared by Dr. A. John Coleman, and "The Consolidated Report", which gives some of the major findings as developed by the workshops in the summer of 1952 in connection with the research-study project, "What is a Christian College?"

The following books are not intended to be an exhaustive listing of the most important volumes available, nor are all of them devoted primarily or wholly to the church colleges. They will, however, indicate the kinds of books which are currently available; reading these will certainly stimulate further thought and suggest many other important publications.

- Bell, Bernard I., *Crisis in Education*, Whittlesey House, 1949.
 Brown, Kenneth I., *Not Minds Alone*, Harper and Brothers, 1954.
 Childs, John L., *Education and Morals*, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1950.
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One of these books is deserving of a further word. It is the recently published volume by Kenneth I. Brown, *Not Minds Alone*. The author is a distinguished educator who appeals for the recovery of Christian values in our schools and colleges as an indispensable factor in educating the whole person. This is a major

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contribution to discussions of what has come to be known as "the university question," and promises to be useful in the thinking and planning of all educators who share Dr. Brown's view that the Christian faith has in it vital resources which are urgently needed if the highest goals of education are to be achieved. Dr. Brown is already well known to the readers of this publication as the former president of Denison University and of Hiram College and who is now executive director of the Danforth Foundation. A forthcoming number of *The Christian Scholar* will present a review of this new book.

A PATTERN FOR LIFE: An Exposition of the Sermon on the Mount. By Archibald M. Hunter. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1953, 116 pages, \$2.00.

This popular booklet, by the Professor of New Testament at the University of Aberdeen, Scotland, supplies in briefest scope the author's view of the Sermon. It is divided into three parts: the Sermon's description, exegesis and meaning. The description of its compilation, literary style and originality serves as a necessary introduction. The exegesis of its content, the largest of the three parts, might better be entitled a commentary or even an eisegesis. The most significant part is devoted to the work of six other interpreters, his own central theme of the New Testament, and the ethic of Jesus, (Can we really talk about 'the ethic of Jesus'? p. 105).

It has been a matter of some curiosity to see how an advocate of the arbitrarily chosen 'heilsgeschichte' type of biblical theology, centering the New Testament message in 'kerygma',—the apostolic preaching, would expound the Sermon on the Mount, which is a compilation of sayings of Jesus of the Wisdom or proverbial type of literature. Dr. Hunter faces this dilemma by subordinating the so-called Sermon to the apostolic preaching, yet not without conflicts which remain unsolved. For example, the 'universality of the Sermon' (p. 26) vs. 'a disciples' ethic', (p. 109). Again, Schweitzer's interim ethic theory is modified in the light of "realized, not futurist eschatology", (p. 107), yet "in a much wider sense than this we Christians live in an interim . . ." (p. 108).

Thus is the ethic of Jesus, so greatly needed in our world today for its moral potential, largely deprived of its conscience-quickenning power.

D. C. TROXEL

APOSTLES OF DISCORD: A STUDY OF ORGANIZED BIGOTRY AND DISRUPTION ON THE FRINGES OF PROTESTANTISM.

By Ralph Lord Roy. Boston: The Beacon Press, 1953. 437—XII pages. \$3.75.

Today, in America, church and state alike are threatened as never before by those who wildly sow the seeds of mistrust, discord, disruption and hate. We live in a time when the very foundations of democracy are being assaulted by an extraordinary array of "warriors", including the self-seeking, power hungry demagogues, the super-patriotic defenders of our liberties whose very weapons tend to

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destroy that which they seek to defend, and fanatical devotees of ideologies of the extreme right and left. No institution in our national community has been entirely free from attack by these disruptive and destructive forces. Ralph Lord Roy has done a very useful and timely piece of work in examining and exposing to public view the identity and activities of those who are operating as "apostles of discord" within Protestantism.

Protestantism's apostles of discord include—according to Mr. Roy—"the flagrant racists, the ultra-nationalists, the pro-communists, the economic extremists, and those who promote division and conflict for personal gain . . ." The one factor which such a collection of diverse individuals and groups has in common is their perversion of Christianity in the encouragement of discord both within and outside of Protestantism. Even so, "for purposes of clarity and in the interests of fairness," Mr. Roy finds it necessary to divide his subjects of inquiry into two categories: "The Ministry of Hate" and "The Ministry of Disruption." While there is some overlapping between the two categories the distinction between them is made quite clear and is helpful to the discerning reader. Those treated under the first category are the more obvious and heinous fomenters of disorder, while those in the latter classification are more subtle and "orthodox" in their methods, perhaps not less dangerous in the threat they pose to Protestantism.

The ministry of hate is participated in actively by those individuals and organizations which seek to use the Christian gospel in helping to spread hatred of non-whites, Jews, and Catholics. Some of the better known of these discussed by the author are Gerald L. K. Smith, Gerald Winrod, Harvey H. Springer, the Anglo-Israelite Movement, the K.K.K., and the National Association for the Advancement of White People.

The ministry of disruption has many branches. One of these is a faction bent upon disrupting—if not destroying—efforts toward cooperation among the major Protestant denominations—the American Council of Christian Churches under the leadership of Carl McIntyre being the most outstanding example. A second group opposes Protestant efforts toward social improvement and defames the men who have taken a leading role in such efforts. Outstanding members of this group include Elizabeth Dilling of "Red Network" fame, the National Economic Council founded and headed up by Merwin K. Hart, and the American Council of Christian Laymen organized by Verne P. Kaub. A third branch is made up of many very influential individuals who are attempting to use religion to help in bringing about an extremely conservative if not reactionary economic and political structure. Of particular note in this effort are: James Fifiield, Congregational minister in Los Angeles, founder and power-behind-the-throne of the organization called Spiritual Mobilization; the Christian Freedom Foundation, Inc., which is supported by such well-known figures as Howard E. Kershner, Percy L. Greaves and Norman Vincent Peale and which publishes the biweekly CHRISTIAN ECONOMICS; and the National Laymen's Committee which was formed in 1950

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under the leadership of J. Howard Pew and which has been used to spearhead a drive to gain influence in the National Council of Churches in order to defend and promulgate economic views of the extreme right.

A fourth branch of the "ministry of disruption" is made up of a small but vociferous minority which has attempted to advance the cause of communism in and through various Protestant organizations. The author includes in this branch such individuals as Kenneth Leslie, editor of *THE PROTESTANT*, Claude Clossey Williams, founder of The People's Institute of Applied Religion, the Rev. William Howard Melish, controversial acting rector of Holy Trinity parish in Brooklyn, and Jack McMichael and Henry F. Ward, former strong men within the Methodist Federation for Social Action (unofficial). Mr. Roy indicates that the threat to the churches from communism is not great in terms of the numbers of ministers and church members converted to this cause, but nevertheless the party regards the churches as important institutions to infiltrate and those who are dedicated to communism are a tenacious lot. Fortunately, in recent years an increasing number of Protestant liberals have become aware of the need to do all in their power to keep the communists from influencing church organizations. Thus the communists have been isolated as they have been forced out of important church agencies and as communist-front groups have been almost entirely deserted by the aroused liberals.

Finally Mr. Roy includes in his discussion of the ministry of disruption a brief analysis of various "denominational dilemmas" brought about by the existence within certain of the major Protestant denominations of political or theological extremists.

Mr. Roy set a task for himself which is next to impossible of accomplishment. Some men are obviously apostles of discord. But what about the borderline cases? And those who sincerely and innocently support movements which create discord? Or those who contribute to discord only through a small part of their activities? It is quite some distance from the American Association for the Advancement of White People to the American Church Union—organization of "high" churchmen within the Protestant Episcopal Church, or from Gerald L. K. Smith to Norman Vincent Peale. The distinction between "ministry of hate" and "ministry of disruption" helps put the reader on guard against ranging all the individuals and groups discussed under the same value judgment. Furthermore, the author has been careful to be as fair and accurate as possible in his analysis. Nevertheless, this book must be used with the greatest of care lest it too contribute to discord.

Many questions are suggested by a reading of this book—questions for both the author and the reader. Is all discord bad? Or, to put it another way, are order and harmony the most important values to be sought after in the Christian community? Is there no place for a vigorous defense of a just cause regardless of where the chips may fall? The author operates on the premise that discord is bad when it is the primary end in itself of a group or individual and when it results

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from the perversion and exploitation of Christianity for selfish and evil ends. On the other hand, he is careful to point out that he does not want to appear merely as a defender of the *status quo*. The Christian will support constructive change which accords as nearly as possible with the content and spirit of his faith.

How serious is the threat from Protestantism's apostles of discord? The author concludes that they "appear to be gaining in numbers and in strength." However, he does not attempt to evaluate their threat to Protestantism and the American community. Here and there he does suggest that the effectiveness of their threat depends upon the receptiveness of the majority of Protestants to their wares. Perhaps an even greater danger to the community than the hate-mongers themselves are those who support them through indifference to the injustices perpetrated against minority groups. And the ministry of disruption gains in power and influence as Protestants allow their thinking on theological and social matters to become befogged by an uncritical acceptance of the application of such emotion-laden epithets as "red", "reactionary", and "modernist" to men and groups.

It is evident that no one is immune from attack by the merchants of hate. Present objects of their attacks include Negroes, Jews, Catholics, one-worlders, liberals, supporters of church unity efforts, capitalist "reactionaries," etc. One may successfully exclude himself from this list but the list can and is expanding. Furthermore whenever anyone unjustly attacks my neighbor I too am involved. "Man is not an island unto himself."

It would appear that the best defense against the apostles of discord is a well-informed and active Protestant constituency. Mr. Roy's book contributes to this end, but it also points beyond itself to the need for a fuller awareness of the political and social implications of the gospel. The apostles of discord recognize the importance of the political and economic realms in national affairs. They do as much as they possibly can to extend their influence in and through these realms. They can be successfully opposed only through activity by sincere and dedicated Christian in both the religious and political communities.

At the same time the existence and work of the apostles of discord make it more mandatory than ever that the fundamentals be reasserted and embraced—the fundamentals of justice, charity, refusing to bear false witness, and love of neighbor.

ROBERT S. MICHAELSEN

Christian Realism and Political Problems. By Reinhold Niebuhr. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1953. 203 pages, \$3.00.

This collection of essays on political, epistemological, and theological themes is straight, vigorous, mature Niebuhr—which of course is saying a great deal. Most of the eleven pieces have appeared previously in a variety of journals; but several of them are new in this book, and most of the reprints have been written in the past two years or so.

Readers unfamiliar with Niebuhr's thought should find this an exciting intro-

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duction to many of its sparkling facets and profound theses. Veteran followers and critics of the Niebuhrian approach will discover here disciplined, deepened treatments of familiar themes, with some stimulating new emphases and elaborations. The brilliance of these selections is remarkably high and sustained, even for Niebuhr.

In those essays in which the political motif predominates, Niebuhr illuminates with his usual incisiveness such topics as the illusion of world government and the real sources of the evil in communism; and he criticizes European socialists rather more sharply than has been his wont for their clinging to parts of the Marxist dogma. Still more interesting is his discussion of American conservatism and liberalism in relation to foreign policy; here he evidences his increasing appreciation of the political wisdom of traditional European conservatism—its instinct for the possible and its recognition of the historical, the organic, the power factors in politics. He finds little trace of these understandings in American "conservatism"; so he remains a forceful "liberal" in terms of current American politics. But paradoxically, and thus appropriately, Niebuhr has recently been laying some deep intellectual foundations for the development of the authentic, decent conservatism we so urgently require.

Another of Niebuhr's invaluable services is his relentless disclosure of ideology—"the existential intimacy between idea and interest"—in the social sciences. He urges that we recognize the crucial differences between the natural and the social-historical sciences. We cannot be empirically accurate in the latter until we give up our false presuppositions about the human self: about the disinterestedness and wisdom of the mind of the social scientist, and also about the men he is studying. In a penetrating and appreciative essay on St. Augustine's political realism (in which he nevertheless seems almost to ignore the saintly distinction between "kingdoms" and "great robberies") Niebuhr sets forth the Biblical affirmations about the self, its radical freedom, and its sinfulness which could thoroughly ventilate the social sciences and set them on the road to sanity.

A deep-cutting analysis of the dialectical relationship between love as law and love transcending law comes to terms with the various traditions of Christian ethics in truly marvelous fashion. But the real classic is the concluding essay, "Coherence, Incoherence, and Christian Faith." In it Niebuhr first demonstrates the incapacity of man's petty schemes of rational coherence to comprehend ultimate truth. Then he convincingly affirms the adequacy of the Christian gospel, which presents itself in the historical-dramatic mode and confirms its suprarational truths by their capacity to resolve and clarify the incoherence, contradictions, and mysteries of human existence. Through criticism of both Christian rationalists and Christian existentialists he negatively, and thus somewhat tantalizingly, delineates his own position of "Biblical realism." This cogent treatise on faith and reason clarifies and goes far toward validating Niebuhr's political analyses, his

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"pragmatic" social ethic, indeed his whole theological position. It is more than adequate climax to a book which bursts with implications in countless directions.

HARRY R. DAVIS.

The Bible and Our Common Life. By Huber F. Klemme. Philadelphia: The Christian Education Press, 1953. 123 pages, \$1.75.

This book seeks to combine theology (or at least some theological affirmations) and social ethics, and to do so under Christian auspices. It is well written and organized. The central themes are all stated in the brief Preface on pages 9 and 10. They are: social action, social ethics, relevance of the Bible for social ethics, and Christian social action. If the author means for these phrases to be regarded as synonymous then he may be open to the charge of begging the question. Yet the fine spirit, tone, and intent of the book help to moderate such a criticism.

There is no special attempt to present arguments as to how the ethics develops from or rests upon the theology. That there is a vital relation is taken for granted rather than argued. It is put forth in graphic affirmations such as: "None of our cherished human rights is entirely secure as a secular basis", "... the strongest foundation for freedom is *religious*" (italic in the text) (page 59), "The justice of which the Bible speaks is, first of all, a standard which derives from God" (page 68).

Rather, the book is a clear, straightforward statement as to what is needed and what ought to be done in certain areas and in response to certain needs. It is brief, yet covers a lot of ground, therefore, is in danger of being charged with over-simplification. It is thus a teaching manual usable as a textbook—and much better written than many texts.

The rubrics under which the overall theme is handled include the following: God and the World, Family, Individual and Community, Rights and Responsibilities, Property, Justice, Religion and Politics, Religion and Race, Nations, Church (these are the ten chapters). This sounds like a large order for 123 pages, and so it is. But we must deal in large terms if we are to stabilize the life of our complex world.

An example of the book's structure and argument, as well as types of response it may evoke, can be presented by references to Chapter 6, "The Bible Talks About Justice" (pages 67-81). This chapter may be called typical. It is the longest by about two pages. Its five sections are: God's Justice, Justice for All, Justice for the Downtrodden, Justice for Labor, Justice in Our Time. On the first page the reader is told that "It is impossible to grasp the message of the Bible unless we understand that the idea of justice is central" (page 67). The first of the five sections makes the point that it is the righteousness of God which "calls for and determines the justice for which man is responsible" (page 68). The second section affirms the universality of this justice. The third displays the Biblical concern for the weak and downtrodden as part of the Biblical stress toward full equality. The fourth makes a case for Labor. The fifth, and longest, is concerned with Justice

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in *Our Time*, and much attention is given to specific discussion of the social values realized by and through cooperatives and labor unions. Of the "aims toward which labor directs its power" (page 77), only those aims which are consonant with a Biblically informed justice are mentioned. Nothing is said of whether this power is ever misdirected, though there is a brief mention of the general point in a previous chapter on page 50. Management is mentioned in a short paragraph, but only the management which is "enlightened and conscientious" (page 78). It is further said that "much depends on whether or not this group uses its power to produce a better product or better service for the public, to deal fairly with its employees, and to meet its other obligations to society" (page 78).

This subtle manifestation of disbalance may of course be due to a conviction that management has tended to be the aggressor in the past two centuries or so. But in all fairness it should be said that, if we are to speak about Biblically oriented norms, it makes a great deal of difference how *any* and *all* groups make use of power which they have or may acquire. From a Biblical standpoint we are *all* subject to "judgment", and the Bible is not automatically on the side of any group, party, or faction. No doubt the author would agree with this, but his language subtly betrays a bias which is not strictly appropriate to an exposition of Biblical guidance on such tremendous themes as *power* and *responsibility*. And one may feel a bit unkind in making this critical observation, but it seems all the more necessary since this is, for the most part, such a good little book.

Those who have a strictly secular interpretation of ethics will object to the theological dimensions in Dr. Klemme's argument. Those who espouse a certain type of theology exclusively concerned with the "beyond" will find his social ethics emphasis entirely too "new dealish". Thus it may be said that his attempt to relate theology and ethics, though highly simplified in this book, is the more difficult, but ultimately the more essential task.

W. GORDON ROSS.

The God in You. By Kermit Eby. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1953.

This spiritual autobiography will appeal to men of contemplation and of action since both these moods have moulded the author's thought. Kermit Eby grew up on a farm in the Pennsylvania-Dutch country of Indiana, matured intellectually at Manchester College and the University of Chicago and has continued to grow spiritually in a series of occupations including grammar school and high school teaching, Educational Director of the C.I.O. and now professor at the University of Chicago. Throughout, his heritage and experience of fellowship in the Church of the Brethren has moulded his thoughts and aspirations.

We have called this a spiritual autobiography, but in reality it is not about the author at all. Rather, it centers on those ideas and aspirations which have guided his thinking and action. The method of presentation is unique. A portion of each chapter relates his own experiences or those of his children or friends. The episodes

embody those guideposts of thought and action which he offers men of our disturbed generation to strengthen their faith and decision.

The Power of Love can drive out our personal or national fears. "I believe there is a way to live above fear, above the daily drain on our spirits and our lives. I believe that God exists within each one of us and, through us, can accomplish the ends of peace on earth good will to men. Or, what amounts to the same thing we can accomplish these things through the God that is in us." (Chapter 1).

The Power of Aspiration gives men the patience to accomplish the seemingly impossible. It gives us courage to stand for the right in Union Hall or Corporation Council.

The Power of Brotherhood was exemplified to the author as a boy when an evangelist joined him in the fellowship of work pitching hay; such fellowship won his allegiance to the Church of the Brethren while preaching "at" him had failed. Brotherhood can create a unity of the races. Unity among men is frequently exemplified in song, but union singing may be dangerous to the employer and union boss alike, because "a singing people are a marching people, and a marching people are people determined to take charge of their own destiny." (Chapter IX).

The Power of Truth can enable us to see ourselves as others see us. "What bothers me is not corruption in America but the hypocrisy of Americans concerning it." (Chapter XI).

The reader should not seek here a systematic exposition of God's activity through men. Rather this is a study of the motivation of one man's life. The method of presentation through experiences, often not his own, saves the volume from being overly subjective. To this reviewer, the core of the thesis is that faith is real only as it is acted upon in concrete situations. This book is recommended particularly to those who wish to see embodied the relation between the life of action and the spirit of contemplation.

WILLIS D. WEATHERFORD

Beyond Anxiety. By James A. Pike. Scribner's: New York, 1953. 149 pages, \$2.75.

In this brief book Dean Pike shows how Christian belief and practice can offer direct help in connection with such problems as fear, frustration, guilt, inhibition, indecision, loneliness and despair. The views of God, Christ and the Church which he advances reflect wide acquaintance with recent theological thinking. Hence *Beyond Anxiety* is superior to several books which have a similar aim but less doctrinal substance. However, people outside as well as inside the Church will find the argument clear and easy to follow; and though the author's convictions are definite, he relies mainly on persuasion rather than dogmatism. Human situations, conflicts and impulses are described in such a down-to-earth fashion that most readers will recognize large parts of the diagnosis as applicable to themselves. Moreover, the remedies suggested incorporate much common sense and practical religious insight, unburdened by prudishness, censoriousness or technical jargon.

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Some of the limitations of the book are virtually inseparable from its merits. Popular phrases, stories and slang help make the writing pungent; but there are references to Christ, God and eternal life which are glib, and very complex psychological and theological themes are sometimes "dusted off" in a page or two. A more serious difficulty arises in connection with Dean Pike's occasional references to psycho-analysis. They manifest a mixture of receptiveness and caution; but his ideas of it are based, in part, upon practices which are rapidly becoming outmoded. Although he uses some of the familiar words, he does not incorporate much awareness of what depth-psychology reveals concerning the dynamics of human personality. It is as though he were willing to leave the unconscious to the psycho-analysts, so that he can get on with the business of what can be accomplished by means of conscious ideas, beliefs, intentions and self-criticism. The resulting restriction, in connection with such matters as anxiety, guilt, inhibition and despair, is a rather severe one; and it limits one's understanding of normal as well as neurotic persons.

The author's purpose is laudable. He wants to help people get themselves together, hold themselves together, and go forward in a more effective, secure manner. But because the book is brief and popular, he has to confine himself to general suggestions. He cannot offer full-scale "case studies", nor can he pay attention to research on the varieties of temperament and character, cultural anthropology, counselling methods, learning theory, or the countless other contributions which have revolutionized psycho-therapy—and are in the process of revolutionizing pastoral work. My criticism is not that the book fails to discuss such matters (that would be impossible in a brief, popular work), but that by failing to take them into account it tends to give people a false notion of what can be accomplished by the means the author actually utilizes. Neurosis often achieves a sort of pseudo-solution by holding large areas of the personality out of awareness. If the person lacks strength or opportunity to achieve a more radical and stable solution, then reduction of suffering or ineffectuality by means which operate at the conscious level may have genuine value; but this value is limited and the person remains vulnerable. The author has protected himself as best he can against the danger of trying to "use" religion as a device for shutting off anxiety, guilt and despair instead of really working them through; but because his treatment of unconscious factors is sketchy, his protection on this score is necessarily sketchy too. Thus his book falls somewhere in the area between the "cheap and easy" literature which represents psychology or religion as a bag of tricks, and the "deep and queasy" literature which takes one right to the bottom of the most difficult psychiatric and theological problems. This leaves the market open for what one hopes is a large number of readers who, precisely because they are not very badly off, can make sensible use of the author's suggestions by means of a discriminating application to their own situations.

The most controversial chapter (on "Inhibition") discusses sex and alcohol

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with a candor praiseworthy in a clergyman. Some of the opinions expressed are debatable; yet the chapter is a responsible, balanced, courageous treatment of the difficult problems involved. Perhaps the best thing in the book is the manner in which a sense of the living community of the Church stands behind the author's discussion of each individual problem.

DAVID E. ROBERTS

A Special Issue of the International Journal of Religious Education

The February number of this publication is devoted to the general subject, "Better Human Relations—Through Religious Education." It is filled with new ideas for local church teachers and leaders arising from the last ten years of improving relations between racial and cultural groups. It contains many practical suggestions and a handy chart on "What Protestants, Catholics, and Jews Believe."

This special issue, produced in cooperation with several national inter-religious and inter-racial organizations, is available upon order from the publication itself, 79 East Adams Street, Chicago 3, Illinois. In quantities, the prices are as follows: 20¢ per copy for orders of 20 or more copies; 25¢ per copy for orders of 10 to 19 copies; and, 30¢ per copy for 1 to 9 copies.

CONTRIBUTORS TO THE BOOKS AND PUBLICATIONS SECTION

Harry Davis is a member of the faculty of Beloit College, teaching in the Department of Government.

Robert S. Michaelson is the newly-appointed administrative director of the School of Religion at the State University of Iowa; he was, until January 1, 1954, assistant professor of American Christianity at Yale Divinity School.

David E. Roberts is Professor of the Philosophy of Religion at Union Theological Seminary, and he is the author of *Psychotherapy and a Christian View of Man*.

W. Gordon Ross is chairman of the Department of Philosophy and Religion of Berea College.

Daniel Curtis Troxel is Professor of New Testament at The College of the Bible in Lexington, Kentucky.

Willis D. Weatherford is on the faculty of Swarthmore College, teaching in the Department of Economics.

Reports and Notices

Conferences for Members of Faculties

Full plans for various types of conferences and seminars designed for teachers and scholars to be held this summer, are not completed as this issue goes to press. A special faculty issue of *Memo*, the newsletter of the Commission on Christian Higher Education, will announce all the details which are known about various conferences of this type in the late spring. Meanwhile, however, several major conferences can be noted.

From June 8-13 a Professors' Conference will be held at Montreat, North Carolina. It is being sponsored jointly by the Presbyterian Church in the U. S. and the Methodist Church, and in cooperation with the Faculty Christian Fellowship. The morning periods will be devoted to lectures on theology (the doctrines of God, Christ, the Holy Spirit, and Man), to be given alternately by Professors Kenneth J. Foreman and James I. McCord. The afternoons will be devoted to explorations of the several intellectual disciplines and Christian faith, making use of both prepared papers and group discussions. Four evening addresses will be given by Dr. John A. Mackay on the General subject, "The Church in the World—Reports from the Continents." The cost of entertainment in the Montreat hotels is \$5.00 a day for room and meals, \$25.00 inclusive for the conference period. Any college or university teacher who is interested is invited to attend. Inquiries should be addressed directly to Dr. Hunter B. Blakely, Presbyterian Church

in the U. S., Eight North Sixth Street, Richmond 9, Virginia.

From June 14-20 a Faculty Conference on Theology will be held at Trinity College, Hartford, Connecticut, under the auspices of the Faculty Conference of the Protestant Episcopal Church and in cooperation with the Faculty Christian Fellowship. Professor A. T. Mollegan will give both the course of lectures in Basic Theology for new members and a course of lectures on The Holy Spirit. Professor Wilbur S. Katz of the School of Law of the University of Chicago will give lectures on Law and the Christian Doctrine of Man, and Professor Paul Lehmann has entitled his course of lectures, "The Reformation and the Remaking of Culture". Seminars are included in the program so that the relationships between the Christian faith and the vocation of the teacher may be explored by all the conference participants. This conference is also open to any college or university faculty members who desire to attend. The total cost is \$20.00 per person for the conference period.

The readers of these notes will be interested to know that Dr. Marjorie Reeves of St. Ann's College, Oxford University, and a teacher who has been in the midst of the Dons' Movement in England (with which Sir Walter Moberly is closely associated) in recent years, will be in the United States from mid-June until early fall. She will be giving leadership to various conferences throughout this period, as guest of the

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Commission on Christian Higher Education.

Persons who are interested in the Summer Seminars held under the auspices of the Danforth Foundation will be interested in the announcement of these opportunities for college teachers on the back cover of this number. Three conferences are being held under the general auspices of the Edward W. Hazen Foundation. The Rocky Mountain Hazen Summer Conference will be held at the Fountain Valley School, August 15-21. During the same period the Central Hazen Summer Conference will be held at College Camp (Lake

Geneva) Wisconsin. The third is the Eastern-Southern Hazen Conference at Pennsylvania College for Women, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

During a portion of the latter half of August, a conference which will include faculty members will be held in Evanston, Illinois, at the National College of Education. This will be simultaneous with the assembly of the World Council of Churches. Plans are currently being made. If you are interested in details, please write to the Faculty Christian Fellowship, 257 Fourth Avenue, New York 10, New York.

The Department of Christian Institutions

RAYMOND F. McLAIN

One of the four departments of the Commission on Christian Higher Education is the Department of Christian Institutions. While the work of this department has implications for non-church-related institutions of higher learning, its direct efforts are confined to the church-related colleges and universities. Two of the other departments of the Commission, namely, the Department of Campus Christian Life and the Department of Christian Vocation, deal with tax-supported and private, as well as with the church-related institutions, while, as its name indicates, the Interseminary Committee works exclusively with the seminaries of America.

PROGRAM ROOTED IN SELF-EXAMINATION

The work of this department can be understood only as knowledge is gained

of the present intellectual and spiritual ferment on the campus of the Christian college. This ferment arises partly from a concern that the college be adequate to the demands laid upon it by the contemporary world. It arises, even more basically from a desire that the college find the most effective ways to give practical expression to its peculiarly Christian insights and responsibilities.

To this end the Christian college is examining itself, and, along with that examination, it is moving into a more responsible religious position in the educational world. Self-examination is not new, but the questioning is reaching a level not always attained prior to this time. More is needed than a rearrangement of curriculum according to some new plan such as "General Education," or the adding of a few new courses such

as those centering around the life of the Orient. Does the college as a whole, and in all its parts, have the new word that the new world needs?

This fundamental questioning is getting at a fundamental answer, although its formulation is by no means complete. The college does have a word to speak. It is the Christian word. True enough, the Christian word is not yet clear in the context of rational inquiry, nor is it yet certain how that word may best be spoken in and through the educational instruments available. Nonetheless, the church colleges are becoming convinced that their peculiar and inescapable responsibility is to provide for the significant and life-giving interplay of reason and the Christian faith. This they must do, furthermore, in a kind of institutional expression that reveals and demonstrates, day by day in the life of all the persons involved, the saving grace of the Christian community.

This obviously requires courses of study in the Christian religion. More, it requires devoted Christians in all subject-matter fields, able to relate Christian beliefs and practices to the significant truths of those various subject-matter fields. This does not mean that there is a "Christian Physics" or a "Christian Psychology". It does mean that Christian professors and students seek for the deepest significance of a physics or psychology related significantly to Christian living. Still more, the illumination of reason with faith offers the Christian religion as a basis for integration of all the subject-matter fields. It is the common ground upon which the specialists may stand. Its

truth is the catalytic agent that can bring other, varied truths into a new relationship both with each other and with the ultimate realities that give all of them significance.

Most of the church colleges are coming to feel a responsibility for the relating of faith and reason, and are studying such means as indicated to see whether or not, through them, their peculiar obligations may be discharged. A number of persistent problems have presented themselves, in one phrasing or another, as the colleges have sought for a meaningful bearing of the Christian world view upon their educational efforts. Perhaps the most persistent is expressed in the fear that the Christian commitment will limit objectivity and destroy academic freedom. This inquiry has led to a new look at objectivity and academic freedom, and a more mature, responsible answer seems to be in process of formation. Has not objectivity always been conditioned by such inescapable factors as time limitation, cultural context, specialization of study, limitation of interest and ability of both teachers and students, and the pressing demands of any given time and place? Have not such conditioning factors always resulted in limiting efforts at inquiry, the selection of subject-matter, and the pre-suppositions that prepare both teachers and students to move in certain intellectual directions? Further isn't academic freedom always conditioned by the fact that the *academe* is also a man, living as a man in a society of men, and subject to the regulations that must, of necessity, arise in the living social group?

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Such questions indicate that rational inquiry, to be rational, must likewise be responsible. It must have this relationship of responsibility to mankind, to some way of life—to some faith. It does not, and cannot, exist apart from life. Rational inquiry is not self-contained, an end in itself. The Christian college is finding how to say that it deliberately chooses the Christian religion as the living context which can give meaning to rational inquiry. It is happy in this choice because the Christian religion as the living context, giving value and direction to rational inquiry must be made by the Christian colleges in America if it is to be made at all in higher education. The tax-supported institution is in no position, either by law or by its nature, to make such a commitment.

A second persistent question arises when the colleges, having accepted their need of the Christian commitment to give meaning to their intellectual effort, recognize the discrepancies between their Christian commitment and their actual daily practice as an educational community. Their commitment judges their behavior. The question is whether, and how, a college may actually be Christian in its many detailed ways of operation. On what basis are faculty selected and students admitted, and what is the nature of the relationship between them? How are each retained in the group, and how advanced? How does the institution spend its money, how does it get it, and from what sources? How do the persons in the college spend their time, and what do they do together? Does Christian love of God

and man actually become the basis of relationships on the campus? Are there organizations, activities, and attitudes that stand in the way of a relationship of Christian love? How is the college related to other educational institutions, to the churches, to the community, and how should it be? How is the nature of the college determined and by whom? How are its purposes determined and reviewed; how frequently and by whom?

These are but illustrations of the hundreds of practical questions that arise when the Christian commitment is taken seriously. It would be dishonest to imply that all institutions are accepting the validity of the questions and are seeking answers with equal seriousness. It is not dishonest to admit their overwhelming concern, and to reveal that the generalized answers, if not the specific, are at least in the direction of the Christian college community. Such a community, conceived as a fellowship of imperfect people, joining in a common effort to grow in Christian grace and practice with reference to rational inquiry, seems to be the key to the solution. Here faculty members, students and administration join in the search for greater truth by stimulating, encouraging, and helping each other. Here forgiveness becomes a daily experience, and love a necessary reality. Here humility opens the way to worship, and life may lose its lonely self-concern.

THE QUADRENNIAL CONVOCATION

One practical result of such self-examination is the Quadrennial Convocation of Christian Colleges, to be

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held at Denison University, Granville, Ohio, June 20-24 of this year. (This entire issue of *The Christian Scholar* is designed as advance study material for the Convocation). To this Convocation will come the president, a teacher, a student, a board member and a religious leader from each of the Christian colleges in America. The various church boards of education that have regularly held summer meetings are foregoing them this summer so that they may join with the other denominational groups in assuring the maximum attendance of twelve hundred.

The theme of the Convocation is "The Christian College and its Responsibilities in American Life Today." Its purposes are three: first, to understand the Protestant Christian college as a Christian community of learners, and to examine the significance of this concept in the total operation of the institution, both on the campus and off. Second, to provide the Protestant Christian colleges an opportunity to understand their strength in united action, and to plan to do together those things that cannot be done separately. Third, to demonstrate to the educational world and to our free society the continuing significance of the Protestant Christian institutions of higher learning.

Among the speakers already secured at the time of this writing are M. M. Thomas, World Student Christian Federation, South India; Marjorie Reeves, Principal of St. Annes College, Oxford University, and Lecturer in History; Roy G. Ross, General Secretary of the National Council of Churches; Howard

Lowry, President of the College of Wooster; Joseph Sittler, Professor, Chicago Lutheran Seminary; Royal Humbert, Professor, Eureka College; Robert L. Calhoun, Professor, Yale University; William Pollard, Director of Nuclear Studies, Oak Ridge Institute; and Irwin Miller, Industrialist, Columbus, Indiana.

In addition to the eight general sessions, forty seminars will meet for four times each, five vocational groupings will meet once, and there will be a session for the delegates in denominational groups. The subject-matter of the seminars will be related to the content of the addresses and will provide the delegates the opportunity to visualize their responsibilities in Christian higher education, both on and off the campus.

This Quadrennial Convocation is a direct outgrowth of two things: the Baptist Assembly for Colleges, where the suggestion originated, and the research-study project, *What Is a Christian College?* in which some two hundred Protestant colleges participated. This study project was the first major program item for the Department of Christian Institutions after its organization in December, 1950.

NATIONAL CHRISTIAN COLLEGE DAY

This "Day," April 25th for 1954, is a major promotional project of the Department of Christian Institutions. Without the fundamental grounding in reason and faith already indicated, the promotion of this day in the interests of the Christian colleges would be

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futile, if not downright misleading. With this basic grounding, such a day provides an opportunity to call to the attention of the "man who runs" the enduring worth of the Christian institutions. NBC, ABC, and the Mutual Broadcasting Company are observing this day on their programs on April 25th.

The general press will have news-stories, and the religious press articles, emphasizing the concerns of the Christian colleges. College presidents, faculty, and students will occupy thousands of church pulpits on that day, to remind the people that the churches and their colleges have much in common. In many other churches the ministers will direct their considerations toward the priority of faith in reason.

OTHER DEPARTMENTAL CONCERNS

This Department is not so officious as to imagine that it is a "voice for Protestant higher education" in America. As a matter of fact, there is no such thing. Individualism among persons and institutions contributed to the making of Protestantism, and that same individualism makes a single "voice" an impracticality. Nonetheless, where

great common Protestant interests are identifiable, this Department helps in the finding of the identity, and in its expression. Much of this expression is through the Association of American Colleges, much through the American Council on Education, and some is through the Department's own offices in New York and Washington—speaking to itself, as it were.

While some of this expression is directed toward Capitol Hill, most of it is directed toward the other Departments, Commissions and Divisions in the National Council itself. It is through this Department of Christian Institutions that the Christian colleges have a chance to assume responsibilities in the life and work of the church, as well as in its missionary concerns, both in America and abroad. Because of this same relationship, those other organized interests of the church may speak to higher education as well, and in the speaking remind Christian education that it is not an end in itself. The Christian colleges, like the people who comprise them, are judged in the end by their ability to glorify God and to serve his children. The Department of Christian Institutions is an instrument to that end.

All inquiries concerning the Department of Christian Institutions, the Quadrennial Convocation of Christian Colleges, and National Christian College Day should be sent either directly to the office of the church's Board of Education as desired, or to Dr. Raymond F. McLain, Commission on Christian Higher Education, 257 Fourth Avenue, New York 10, New York.

The Joint Department of Christian Vocation

E. H. JOHNSON and ELMER G. MILLION

Purpose. The Joint Department of Christian Vocation of the National Council of Churches has been formed "to serve the Council and its constituent communions and agencies so as: a. To develop a concept of Christian vocation true to the Gospel and responsive to our time; b. To appeal for commitment of all life to such Christian vocation; c. To promote an understanding of the Church's unique function and present its special vocational claims; and, d. To put forward a comprehensive program of education and enlistment among youth, especially students, for the total life and service of the churches at home and overseas."

History. The Joint Department came into being largely as an extension of the particular interests of the Student Volunteer Movement for Christian Missions and the Commission on the Ministry of the Federal Council of Churches. The former had been concerned with a program of education and enlistment of college students for missionary service both at home and abroad. The latter was focused on the enlistment of men and women for the ministry of the Church. Both groups found that their particular concerns led them continually into a broad consideration of the meaning of Christian vocation and also into the work of calling men and women to life commitment to Christ in various lay vocations. In 1949, when both groups began to discuss the question of their relationship to the National Council, then soon to be formed, they engaged

in considerations which resulted in the formation of a Provisional Committee which prepared proposals leading to the formation of a Joint Department of Christian Vocation.

Structure and Relationships. As a Joint Department, Christian Vocation is responsible in matters of function and program to the four Divisions of the Council and reports directly to the General Board. It is administratively related to the Commission on Christian Higher Education. Its own work is governed by a Board and Executive Committee, and by the administrative bodies of its units which at present are two, the Department of the Ministry, and the Missionary Services Department.

Program. At the present time the work of the Joint Department is expressed largely through its two units whose life and activities are outlined below. When the Department is fully constituted early in 1954 it is hoped to move forward in the field of general Christian Vocation both in co-ordinating the concerns in this field of any units of the Council, and in exploring more fully the meaning of the concept.

THE DEPARTMENT OF THE MINISTRY

Purpose. The Department of the Ministry exists "to carry forward a program of education and enlistment for the Christian ministry of the church." At the present time it is also responsible for carrying forward similar activities on behalf of "the specialized ministries of the church".

History. The Department continues

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the work of the Commission on the Ministry originally established in 1944 by the Federal Council of Churches. The Commission was extremely active from October 1, 1945, to July 1, 1950, under the leadership of Dr. John Oliver Nelson. Almost coincident with the termination of Dr. Nelson's services, the Federal Council of Churches' Commission became a department of the National Council of Churches. From this time until October 1953, Dr. Robert Gibson, Mr. Charles Sutton, and Dr. Raymond McLain successively directed the work of the Department on a part-time basis. Since October 1, 1953, the Rev. Elmer G. Million has been executive director on a full-time basis.

Program. Characteristic activities of the Department have been the following: study of what constitutes a Christian ministry; survey and analysis of what seminaries are doing in the area of testing, screening and counseling; representing the needs and claims of the churches in vocational guidance organizations; helping denominational staff improve their recruiting operations; publication of *Church Vocation Notes* and other occasional materials; collaboration in the production of complementary audio-visuals; maintaining a voluntary field staff of church vocations monitors on college and university campuses; cooperation in the conduct of special conferences; interpreting training requirements to prospective ministers; and, assisting in the total training process.

Some future program possibilities presently being considered have to do with vocational counseling and church school curricula. It may be possible to

perfect instruments and procedures for finding and evaluating prospects for the ministry in our public high schools and colleges. Through our church school curricula we may be able to increase the extent and quality of that kind of Christian nurture which enables youth to respond to the challenge of church vocations.

Organization. All such program possibilities will be carefully explored and acted on by the Department's administrative committee. This committee is made up of denominational staff, selected National Council of Churches personnel, representatives of institutions of higher education, and professional persons with special competencies. A representative executive committee will be responsible for implementing the decisions of the larger committee, and will generally guide the Department's work between sessions of the administrative committee.

MISSIONARY SERVICES DEPARTMENT

Name and Purposes. The name of the Missionary Services Department is the Student Volunteer Movement for Christian Missions. Its purpose as stated in the By-laws of the Joint Department is "to serve the Council and its constituent communions and agencies by carrying forward and expanding the work of the Student Volunteer Movement for Christian Missions."

The Movement is at present revising its statement of purpose but a tentative draft states that the purpose is "to call students in the United States to commit their lives to the world mission of Christ's Church."

"In achieving this purpose SVM

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shall: a. Be a movement of students who have recorded the following purpose: "I purpose to devote my life work to the world mission of Christ's Church."

b. Be a movement of fellowship, encouragement, counsel, study, prayer and common action which is itself a relevant witness in the world and especially in the university to God's redemptive purpose for the whole world. c. Seek to lead other students to join in this common commitment to the world mission of Christ's Church. d. Relate students who have this purpose to the proper agencies of the Church for counsel and sending to missionary frontiers. And, e. Make an organized effort to re-awaken and develop the missionary life of the churches of the student Christian movements."

Historical Background. The past record of SVM is briefly noted in a preamble of its By-laws as the Missionary Services Department as follows: "The Student Volunteer Movement for Foreign Missions was born in 1886 out of the concern of a group of students to recruit fellow students for missionary service. With the watchword 'The evangelization of the world in this generation,' with a simple declaration of purpose, with local student volunteer bands, and with great national quadrennial conferences, it carried on a program which had a profound influence on the student Christian movements and far-reaching results in strengthening the foreign mission enterprise. In 1945 its scope was broadened to include home missions and the name was changed to Student Volunteer Movement for Christian Missions. While an autonomous movement

it has worked in close relationship to student Christian movements and to home and foreign mission boards and groups, and has been recognized by them as the interdenominational agency for missionary education and recruitment among students. Within the National Council of the Churches of Christ in the U.S.A. which brings together cooperative agencies and movements of the churches the Missionary Services Department has been set up to carry forward and expand the work of the Student Volunteer Movement for Christian Missions, Inc."

Present Structure and Relationships. Within the National Council, the Movement will be closely associated with other units working in the field of higher education and also with home and foreign mission groups. At the same time, it will continue its identity as a movement of students in the student Christian groups and will have initiative in matters of "philosophy, policy, and program."

Organizationally, the Student Volunteer Movement has a Board of Directors with 37 senior members drawn from mission groups, student movement staff and interested lay people, and 38 student members who represent the various student movements.

The staff of the Movement includes a General Secretary, E. H. Johnson, an Administrative Secretary, W. W. Keys, as Assistant Secretary, Nancy Lawrence, and a Field Program Director and Educational Secretary, positions, temporarily vacant.

Life and Program. In recent years the movement has been growing in

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strength and in self-consciousness, and at the same time has been moving towards a closer integration of all its program with that of the various Protestant student movements. The uncertainty and confusion of the decade of depression caused both the student movements and the missionary movement to rethink their purposes. Since its reorganization 12 years ago, the Student Volunteer Movement has moved out into a new day of competence and service. It is loyal to both the student Christian movements and the missionary societies and has the hearty support of both.

Its life is expressed in a vigorous program of campus visits by missionaries and nationals which will touch

300 or more campuses during the present academic year; by the publication of vocational and study literature; by its student members who make their witness in local, regional and national groups; and by regional and national conferences of which the most important are the quadrennials.

The aims of the Student Volunteer Movement will not be fulfilled until all of our Christian educational program is helping every Christian student to see his responsibility in the total world-wide task of the Church and is preparing large numbers of able students for particular leadership and service in that world-wide mission.

CONTRIBUTORS TO THE REPORTS AND NOTICES SECTION

E. H. Johnson is Executive Secretary of the Student Volunteer Movement, the Missionary Services Department of the Joint Department of Christian Vocation. Elmer G. Million is the Executive Director of the Department on the Ministry of the Joint Department of Christian Vocation.

Raymond F. McLain is General Director of the Commission on Christian Higher Education, giving executive leadership at the same time to the Department of Christian Institutions and the programs of this Department in connection with the church-related colleges.





